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A. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to examine whether the legal standards underpinning the 
application of  Article 102 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European 
Union (TFEU) need to be revisited in light of  the alleged specifi cities of  tech-
nology-enabled markets. To this end, the paper is divided into seven parts. 
Following this short introduction (A), the paper offers fi rst a defi nition of  the 
very notion of  technology-enabled markets (B). It then questions whether 
competition agencies should depart from conventional enforcement techniques 
when reviewing conduct in fast-moving, technology-enabled markets, and follow 
new, expedited enforcement procedures as proposed recently by several high-
ranking offi cials (C). After this, the paper turns to substantive issues. It begins 
by reviewing the intricacies of  market defi nition and dominance in technology-
enabled markets (D). It then offers some general thoughts on whether a new, 
general legal standard for the determination of  unlawful abuse is needed in 
technology-enabled markets (E). Finally, the paper considers six categories of  
abusive conduct in the high-tech sector and shows that, faced with a variety of  
applicable legal standards for each of  them, competition agencies, courts and 
plaintiffs have—understandably—almost always invoked and applied the loosest 
possible test in support of  their allegations or fi ndings. We suggest, in turn, 
that under existing case law stricter standards could and should be applied, 
and that this is particularly important in the context of  technology-enabled 
markets for the simple reason that it is in these markets that the most common 
pitfalls and shortcomings of  the EU law on abuse of  a dominant position are 
magnifi ed (F).
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B. IN SEARCH OF A WORKABLE DEFINITION 
OF TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED MARKETS
Recent competition law literature is rife with references to a new type of  
markets which would arguably require specifi c treatment under the EU compe-
tition rules. The labels used to describe these markets vary: high-technology 
industries,1 dynamically competitive industries,2 innovative industries,3 the 
digital economy,4 the innovation economy,5 etc. One common feature of  all 
of  these expressions is that they seek to encompass the “new economy,”6 ie 
sectors as diverse as microprocessors, computer software, online distribution, 
the internet, etc. Maybe more importantly, another feature common to all of  
these notions is that, in those industries, technology plays a pivotal role in the 
competitive process. Hence, in the remainder of  this paper, we refer to those 
markets as “technology-enabled markets”.
Against this background, we consider that it is not possible to answer the 
question whether established legal standards should be reconsidered in tech-
nology-enabled markets without fi rst understanding what those markets really 
are, what they comprise and what makes them special. The fi rst step in our 
assessment should therefore consist in trying to circumscribe as precisely as 
possible the notion of  a technology-enabled market. 
In layman’s terms, technology is defi ned as the use of  science for industrial 
and commercial purposes. Because most markets in today’s economy can be 
said to be technology-enabled, including ageing industries from the nineteenth 
1 See J Temple Lang, “European Community Antitrust Law—Innovation Markets and High 
Technology Industries” (New York, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 17 October 1996), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1996_054_en.html.
2 See D Geradin, C Ahlborn, V Denicolò and J Padilla, “DG Comp’s Discussion Paper on 
Article 82: Implications of  the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically 
Competitive Industries” (March 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=894466.
3 See R Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy”, Olin Working Paper No 106 (University of  
Chicago Law & Economics, November 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=249316.
4 See J Almunia, “Antitrust Enforcement: Challenges Old and New”, SPEECH/12/428, 
presented at the 19th International Competition Law Forum, St Gallen, 8 June 2012, available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-428_en.htm.
5 See F Manjoo, “Apple, Facebook, Google, and Amazon Battle for the Future of  the Innovation 
Economy” (19 October 2011), available at http://www.fastcompany.com/1784824/great-tech-
war-2012. 
6 A 1983 cover article in TIME Magazine described the transition from heavy industry to a 
new technology-based economy. See C Alexander, A Zagorin and G Bolt, “The New 
Economy”, TIME Magazine, 30 May 1983, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,926013,00.html. Wikipedia uses the expression “The new economy” to describe 
the result of  the transition from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy. 
Judge Posner defi nes the new economy as covering “three distinct though related industries. 
The fi rst is the manufacture of  computer software. The second consists of  the internet-based 
businesses (internet access providers, internet service providers, internet content providers), 
such as AOL and Amazon. And the third consists of  communications services and equipment 
designed to support the fi rst two markets”. See Posner, supra n 3.
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and twentieth centuries such as steel, car manufacturing, defence, chemical 
products, energy and agriculture, the notion of  technology is not particularly 
helpful in ascertaining the boundaries and key characteristics of  the markets 
we propose to review. 
A better approach may thus be to seek to identify, within the existing 
economic literature, those features which seem most prevalent in such tech-
nology-enabled markets. Our conclusion is that a market can be said to be 
technology enabled if  the competitive process is shaped by the presence of  
most or all of  the following features. 
First, technology-enabled markets display an intense degree of  innovative 
activity. From an economic standpoint, the importance of  innovative activity is 
generally measured by the magnitude of  R&D activities (eg R&D expenditure, 
number of  R&D employees, scientists and engineers, amount of  R&D subsidies 
obtained from state institutions, etc), by fi rms’ patenting activity (number of  
patent applications, of  patents awarded, of  patent citations, etc) and by the 
sales of  new products following the introduction of  an invention.7 In other 
words, a key feature of  technology-enabled markets is that they are occupied 
by fi rms with signifi cant R&D activities and which rely heavily on the intellec-
tual property (IP) system. The intensity of  innovation may also be considered 
from a quantitative standpoint.8 Technology-enabled markets generally display 
a signifi cant degree of  “drastic” innovation—ie innovation that leads to the 
appearance of  new products, eg tablet computers, digital cameras, electrical 
engines, fl at screen TVs, etc.9—in addition to “incremental” innovation—ie 
innovation that simply improves existing products (by increasing their func-
tionality or decreasing their costs), eg a wireless computer mouse and the 
embedding of  digital cameras in smartphones.10 
Secondly, the pace of  innovation in technology-enabled markets is rapid. 
In 1965, Gordon Moore, the co-founder of  Intel, predicted that computing 
capacity performance would double every 18–24 months in the following 
decades.11 Whilst Moore’s Law has since been proved wrong, his prediction is 
7 See M Kamien and N Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation (Cambridge University Press, 1982).
8 Those proxies are inherently imperfect. Some important innovations are indeed never patented 
(eg software). Moreover, major inventions are sometimes introduced by small fi rms with 
relatively limited R&D capacities.
9 Some also refer to this as “breakthrough”, “platform” or “disruptive” innovation.
10 Some also refer to this as “sequential” innovation. Interestingly, some business theorists seem 
to ascribe lower value to “sustaining” technologies, which improve the performance of  existing 
products in the short term, rather than to “disruptive” technologies that threaten the existence 
of  existing technologies in the long term. See C Christensen, R Bohmer and J Kenagy, “Will 
Disruptive Innovations Cure Health Care?” (2000) 78(5) Harvard Business Review 102, available at 
https://wiki.umms.med.umich.edu/download/attachments/118335374/disruptive-innovations-
cure-health.pdf.
11 See G Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits” (1965) 8 Electronics 
82, available at http://download.intel.com/museum/Moores_Law/Articles-Press_Releases/
Gordon_Moore_1965_Article.pdf.
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often cited to illustrate the fact that products have a short life-cycle in technol-
ogy-enabled markets, and that companies must innovate constantly to remain 
in the game. In contrast, sectors such as pharmaceuticals, where the life cycle 
of  products is very lengthy, do not belong to the list of  technology-enabled 
markets identifi ed in the above-mentioned literature.
Thirdly, transactions in technology-enabled markets often involve intangible 
goods, such as ideas, patents, interoperability and design standards, specifi ca-
tions, design protocols, and digital fi les (eg images, music, videos).12 This does 
not mean, of  course, that such markets do not include transactions for tangible 
goods (eg computers, chipsets); but the main implication is that fi xed costs in 
technology-enabled markets are often constant (there are limited/few capacity 
constraints for the supply of  intangible goods), variable costs are low (intangible 
goods can be replicated at virtually no cost) and transport costs come close to 
zero (intangible goods can usually be transmitted across digital communications 
networks at almost no cost).
Fourthly, technology-enabled markets typically exhibit network effects. The 
notion of  network effects is often linked to Metcalfe’s Law, which posits that 
technologies become more useful as more people use them.13 More precisely, 
network effects arise “when a product is more valuable to a user the more users 
adopt the same product or compatible ones”.14 Typical examples of  sectors 
that exhibit network effects include video games, computer operating systems 
(OS) and social networks.15 In certain technology markets, network effects are 
indirect. This situation occurs when an increase in the number of  one category 
of  users (for instance, Facebook subscribers) makes a product more valuable 
to other categories of  users (for instance, fi rms that display advertisements on 
Facebook). In such two-sided markets, it is not rare to witness cross-payments 
between the various categories of  users (for instance, Facebook subscribers 
acquire the service for free, whilst advertisers fi nance it).
Fifthly, technology-enabled markets are prone to fi rst-mover advantages and 
winner-takes-all effects. In markets characterised by drastic innovation, the fi rm 
that releases a new disruptive product will create a new market in which it will 
12 See H Varian, J Farrell and C Shapiro, The Economics of  Information Technology (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 7.
13 Metcalfe’s Law states that if  the value of  each user in a network is proportional to the number 
of  other users, then the total value of  the network is proportional to the square of  the total 
number of  users.
14 See European Commission Glossary, “Network effect”, available at http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/publications/glossary_en.pdf. 
15 On network effects see, eg N Economides, “Network Externalities, Complementarities, and 
Invitations to Enter” (1996) 2 European Journal of  Political Economy 211; N Economides, “The 
Economics of  Networks” (1996) 6 International Journal of  Industrial Organization 673; M Katz and 
C Shapiro, “Systems Competition and Network Effects” (1994) 2 Journal of  Economic Perspectives 
93; A Melamed, “Network Industries and Antitrust”(1999-2000) 23 Harvard Journal of  Law & 
Public Policy 147.
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often enjoy a durable leadership—or even a monopolistic position—until other 
fi rms adapt and enter the new market.16 Importantly, because the fi rst mover 
will service the entire market demand, at least for some period of  time, it may 
benefi t from economies of  scale that new entrants will not be able to replicate 
at least in the short term. This incumbency advantage of  the fi rst mover may 
be further magnifi ed if  the invention in question is protected by intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and if  the market is subject to network effects, etc.
Sixthly, technology-enabled markets often display signifi cant price and 
product differentiation because technology makes it exponentially easier for 
suppliers to charge customised prices for similar goods and services on the 
basis of  customer behaviour, characteristics, location, etc.
Seventhly, standard-setting activities, which aim to achieve device interopera-
bility and product compatibility, play a fundamental role in technology-enabled 
markets. For instance, a modern laptop computer embodies or utilises at least 
251 interoperability standards.17
Finally, technology-enabled markets are often deemed to exhibit switching 
costs and, in turn, to give rise to lock-in effects.18 The idea is as follows: users 
of  technology-enabled products that contemplate changing suppliers will often 
be discouraged from switching because this will entail all sorts of  costs (not 
only in fi nancial terms, but also in terms of  loss of  time, convenience, etc). For 
instance, a consumer who changes computers and acquires a device running 
a different OS may have to modify document formats, purchase and become 
familiar with new application software, etc. He will also have to get acquainted 
with a new product. Similarly, companies wishing to change software environ-
ments will often have to hire consultants, retrain their professional force, shut 
their daily activities for some days, etc.19 In certain circumstances, those costs 
can be so high that it would be unthinkable for customers to change suppliers.20
Competition authorities often tend to view switching costs as an endemic 
feature of  technology-enabled markets.21 In turn, they often seem eager to infer 
16 Sometimes, the disruptive fi rm merely creates a new market segment.
17 See B Biddle, A White and S Woods, “How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other 
Empirical Questions)”, available at http://standardslaw.org/How_Many_Standards.pdf. 
18 On these notions, see P Klemperer, “Markets with Consumer Switching Costs” (1987) 2 The 
Quarterly Journal of  Economics 375; P Klemperer, “The Competitiveness of  Markets with Switching 
Costs” (1987) 1 The RAND Journal of  Economics 138; J Farrell and C Shaprio, “Dynamic Com-
petition with Switching Costs” (1988) 1 The RAND Journal of  Economics 123; P Klemperer, 
“Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to 
Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade” (1995) 4 Review of  Economic 
Studies 515; B Garcia Mariñoso, “Technological Incompatibility, Endogenous Switching Costs 
and Lock-in” (2001) 3 The Journal of  Industrial Economics 281. 
19 On top of  those costs, “hassle costs” and possible status quo biases may further increase inelas-
ticity on the demand side. See, eg M Hviid and G Shaffer, “Hassle Costs: The Achilles’ Heel 
of  Price-Matching Guarantees” (1999) 4 Journal of  Economics & Management Strategy 489.
20 See Varian et al, supra n 12, 21.
21 Ibid.
6 Abuse of  Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets ECJ VOL. 9 NO 1
that competition in those markets is suboptimal. In our opinion, however, such 
a broad assumption would be incorrect. Switching costs are not specifi c to tech-
nology-enabled markets. In fact, they can be observed in many other markets 
(eg retail banking, air transport, legal services). Moreover, switching costs are 
absent from many markets that can be qualifi ed as technology-enabled. For 
instance, users incur little cost when they switch printers, digital cameras, 
etc. Even on the particular subset of  software and in internet markets, where 
switching costs are allegedly widespread and signifi cant, their occurrence and 
magnitude appear overestimated. To take the example of  the information and 
communications technology (ICT) sector, the fact that many software products 
are given away for free, that competition is often just “one click away”22 (eg 
on software downloading platforms) and that storage capacities are unlimited 
means that users can easily switch to more effi cient sources of  supply. The 
rapid erosion of  Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser’s market share following 
the entry of  Mozilla Firefox into the web browser’s market is a good illustra-
tion of  this phenomenon.
That said, and despite these reservations, we include switching costs in our 
list of  features of  technology-enabled markets so as to provide a full account 
of  the academic literature on this issue.
C. IS A NEW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH WARRANTED 
IN TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED MARKETS?
Technology markets are fast moving. This creates a challenge for antitrust 
agencies, whose traditional enforcement procedures are generally slow and 
cumbersome: antitrust proceedings habitually span several years. In Microsoft 
I,23 for instance, Sun Microsystems lodged a complaint in 1998 and it took 
over 10 years for the Commission to administer remedies. Similarly, in Intel,24 
nine years elapsed between AMD’s complaint and the Commission’s infringe-
ment decision.
Against this background, it will come as no surprise that commentators (and 
many agency offi cials) have advocated new, swifter, enforcement procedures in 
fast-moving markets. In two recent speeches, Commissioner Almunia hinted that 
he would not wait until push comes to shove. In fast-moving markets, he said, 
“restoring competition swiftly to the benefi t of  users at an early stage is always 
22 See A Kovacevicj, “Google’s Approach to Competition”, Google Public Policy Blog, 8 May 2009, 
available at http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.be/2009/05/googles-approach-to-competition.
html.
23 See Microsoft [2007] OJ L32/23.
24 See Intel [2009] OJ C227/13.
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preferable to lengthy proceedings”.25 Shortly thereafter, the Commissioner put 
theory to practice, with the unprecedented move of  publicly requesting com-
mitments from Google under threat of  issuing a Statement of  Objections.26
Although it seems fairly abstract at this stage, the Commissioner’s proposed 
new approach appears to have two manifest features. First, the Commission 
seems convinced that in fast-moving markets, anticompetitive exclusion can 
take place in a matter of  days. An ex ante approach would thus be required to 
prevent harm. From a technical standpoint, this means that antitrust agencies 
would have to intervene before the occurrence of  actual anticompetitive effects, 
as soon as there is a risk of  likely anticompetitive effects.
Secondly, the Commissioner’s proposal suggests that the long and tortuous 
procedural route of  standard antitrust proceedings should be avoided. High-tech 
cases should be dealt with under faster mechanisms, such as interim measures 
or Article 9 settlements.27 As the Commissioner himself  stated: “the companies 
concerned [must be] ready to seriously address and solve the problems at 
stake”.28 This method has the advantage that the Commission does not have to 
formally prove a competition law infringement. In addition, it would allow the 
Commission to secure behavioural and structural remedies as extensive, if  not 
more so, than those it would be able to secure relying on traditional enforce-
ment proceedings. Finally, when the Commission applies remedies through this 
method, it does not need to pass the demanding “proportionality” test, and it 
is close to immune from judicial challenge by the parties in question.
On closer analysis, the Commissioner’s proposed new approach appears 
similar to sector-specifi c regulatory mechanisms, such as those applied in network 
industries: intervention takes place ex ante, ideally before the occurrence of  actual 
anticompetitive effects, due process safeguards are kept to a minimum, intrusive 
remedies are imposed, there are no fi nes, etc. The only clear difference with 
sector specifi c regulation is perhaps that the Commissioner’s proposed process 
is more collaborative (see Table I). All in all, however, the Commission seems 
to be casting an envious eye at the working methods and powers of  sectoral 
regulators.
Whilst, at fi rst blush, it appears commendable—the mantra that fast-moving 
markets need swift antitrust oversight seems to make sense—the Commissioner’s 
proposed approach would, in our view, constitute an unsound, and unlawful, 
25 See J Almunia, “Statement of  Vice-President Almunia on the Google Antitrust Investigation”, 
SPEECH/12/372 (Brussels, 21 May 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases-
Action.do?reference=SPEECH/12/372; Almunia, supra n 4.
26 “Statement of  Vice-President Almunia", ibid, a request which is arguably devoid of  legal basis 
and of  binding effects. The fact that Google responded to it may either have to do with 
Google’s well-known settlement culture or with the willingness to benefi t from mitigating cir-
cumstances, should fi nes ever be imposed at a later stage.
27 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of  16 December 2002 on the implementation of  the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102] of  the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/1.
28 See Almunia, supra n 4.
8 Abuse of  Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets ECJ VOL. 9 NO 1
expansion of  the mandate of  EU competition law far beyond its remit. In 
network industries the adoption, through sector-specifi c legislation, of  heavy-
handed ex ante remedies that go far beyond what would be possible through 
the traditional application of  competition rules results from two assumptions, 
neither of  which are necessarily present in high-tech markets.
The fi rst of  these assumptions is that network industries are characterised 
by the presence of  insurmountable barriers to entry. However, in many tech-
nology-enabled markets, barriers to entry are low. Unlike in network industries, 
where incumbents’ dominance translates into permanence, incumbents in fast-
moving markets are often giants with feet of  clay. The history of  technology 
abounds with examples of  defeated monopolists. Think of  the demise of  
Kodak, a well-known monopolist of  the twentieth century, or of  famous web 
portals such as AOL, Yahoo! and MySpace, or of  the current predicaments of  
once-mighty mobile handset makers such as Motorola and Nokia.
The second of  these assumptions is that the risk of  anticompetitive effects is 
very high in network industries. Here again, however, it is far from clear that 
this risk will be present in technology-enabled markets. It is true that the key 
features of  competition in fast-moving technology markets often leads to the 
emergence of  fi rms with many of  the classic outward signs of  a monopolist: 
very high market shares, aggressive market behaviour and signifi cant profi t 
margins. Yet these elements should not be mistaken for undeniable proof  of  
the existence of  signifi cant market power or, more importantly, of  unlawful 
anticompetitive conduct. Large market shares are often ephemeral; high profi t 
margins not only represent the necessary reward for substantial risk-taking, 
but are also often due to specifi cities in cost structures and, in particular, to 
Table I: Comparison of  the Proposed Enforcement Approach for 
High-Tech Markets with SSR and Antitrust Enforcement
Sector-specifi c regulation Proposed approach for high-
tech industries
Classic antitrust approach
Ex ante Ex ante Ex post
No proof  of  anticompetitive 
object/effects
No proof  of  antitrust offence 
(serious concerns, even before 
SO)
Proof  of  antitrust offence (anti-
competitive object/effect)
Remedies Commitments Remedies/fi nes
Minimal due process require-
ments
Minimal due process require-
ments
Heavy due process require-
ments
No fault No fault Fault
Ongoing monitoring Ongoing monitoring of  com-
mitments
One shot
Injunctive Hybrid (settlement, but com-
mitments are mandatory)
Injunctive or collaborative
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increasing returns to scale; and what appears to be aggressive conduct may in 
fact constitute a novel commercial strategy which does not fall squarely within 
existing standards of  per se legality.
The upshot of  this is that the traditional identifi cation problem29 encoun-
tered in the application of  Article 102 is compounded in technology-enabled 
markets. It is often harder in high-tech industries to separate the wheat of  
competition on the merits from the chaff  of  anticompetitive behaviour.30 Put 
differently, technology-enabled markets may be more prone to decisional errors, 
especially if  the preventive ex ante approach advocated by the Commission of  
late were to be followed.
More importantly, the consequences of  getting it wrong—ie intervening to 
curb competitive behaviour—are likely to be far more severe in technology-
enabled markets than in other industries. This is so for at least three reasons.
First, as explained by Professor Varian,31 these markets are often “combi-
natorial”, meaning that they draw on distinct technologies “whose rich set of  
components can be combined and recombined to create new products”. Those 
markets have the potential to generate multiple innovations across diverse 
economic sectors, as the developers of  technology products run through the 
myriad possibilities available to them.32 The development of  the gasoline engine, 
which was incorporated into and combined with a variety of  products, including 
cars, boats, generators, etc, is a typical example of  combined innovation. 
29 The identifi cation problem refers to the fundamental question of  determining what is legal or 
illegal behaviour under competition law. Michele Polo, suggests a two steps methodology to 
solve the question:
“The most compelling task in the application of  Article 82 rests on the need to distinguish 
unilateral practices aimed at foreclosing the market from conducts that characterize com-
petition in an oligopolistic environment. The legal rule, indeed, prohibiting the abuse of  a 
dominant position, is intended to prevent the former without placing too many restrictions 
on oligopolistic competition. The enforcer should try to prevent abuses without chilling com-
petition on the merits . . . In this perspective, I argue that the correct evaluation of  a given 
episode requires a double task. First, I need to carefully specify the kind of  anticompetitive 
story I have in mind . . . As the second step, I need to analyse the characteristics of  the 
market environment and the mode of  competition that would better fi t the case when no 
anticompetitive strategy is in place . . . The anticompetitive and competitive stories must be 
spelt out in detail, selecting from the economic analysis the explanations (models) that best 
fi t the market environment and the fi rms’ characteristics. This way, I can obtain two sets of  
empirical predictions, some of  which may be common in the two stories and others that 
occur only in one of  them. These latter factual elements are those that allow for identifying 
the proper explanation.”
M Polo,“ Anticompetitive vs Competitive Explanations of  Unilateral Practices: the Identifi cation 
Problem” (2010) 6(2) Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 458, 474. See also W Kovacic, “Identifi -
cation and Proof  of  Horizontal Agreements under the Antitrust Laws” (1993) 38 Antitrust Bulletin 5.
30 Beyond abuse of  dominance, this identifi cation problem exists in many other areas of  compe-
tition law, and more generally of  economics (eg in econometrics).
31 See Varian et al, supra n 12, 5.
32 See C Shapiro and H Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard 
Business Press, 1999), 5.
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Similarly, the internet, which was initially designed for point-to-point computer 
communication in the military sector, has subsequently spawned a myriad of  
new applications through its combination with technologies as diverse as fi xed 
and mobile telephony, television, music, gaming and optical imaging, with new 
applications being created on a daily basis. As a result, antitrust intervention 
in respect of  one component may have unintended (and detrimental) conse-
quences for one or more related and interdependent components.
Secondly, curtailing the rewards available to market leaders in technology-
enabled markets through antitrust intervention will reduce the incentives to 
innovate not only for the alleged infringer but also for innovators more generally. 
By their very nature, these markets generally lack legal precedents and, as 
such, any decision enforcing the competition rules against innovative types of  
conduct will typically become the yardstick against which other innovators will 
assess the lawfulness of  their commercial strategies and investors will gauge the 
risk inherent in directing resources to other technologies.33
Thirdly, the negative consequences of  over-enforcement will be more 
pronounced in technology-enabled markets, in particular in information and 
communications technologies, than in other markets. This is because those 
markets are deemed to be the key drivers of  growth in modern, knowledge-
based economies.34
In our view, all this casts doubt on the desirability of  the Commissioner’s 
proposals for a new approach to enforcement in fast-moving markets. Interest-
ingly, other Commission services have explicitly stated that ex ante sector-specifi c 
regulatory mechanisms were ill-suited to (newly) emerging markets. For example, 
in its Communication on relevant markets in electronic communications, the 
Commission stated that:
“Newly emerging markets should not be subject to inappropriate obliga-
tions, even if  there is a fi rst mover advantage . . . Newly emerging markets 
are considered to comprise products or services, where, due to their novelty, 
it is very diffi cult to predict demand conditions or market entry and supply 
conditions, and consequently diffi cult to apply the three criteria. The purpose 
of  not subjecting newly emerging markets to inappropriate obligations is to 
promote innovation . . .”35
33 Of  course, some may argue that this approach would have the merit of  allowing the Commission 
to provide timely guidance to market participants. This argument is not persuasive simply 
because Art 9 commitment decisions hardly provide any guidance to market participants. In 
addition, if  the Commission really wishes to provide guidance it has other, less burdensome 
instruments at its disposal (eg guidelines, guidance letters).
34 See Conclusions of  the European Council of  17 June 2010 adopting the “Europe 2020” 
strategy for growth (EUCO 13/10 CO EUR 9 CONCL 2). See also “Communication from 
the Commission, Europe 2020, A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth”, 
COM(2010) 2020 fi nal.
35 See Commission Recommendation of  17 December 2007 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
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D. MARKET DEFINITION AND DOMINANCE 
IN TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED MARKETS
Against this background, we now turn to substantive issues. Before dealing 
with the notion of  abuse, this section focuses on market defi nition and 
dominance. More specifi cally, it takes a closer look at several misconceptions 
about dominance that often vitiate the competitive assessment of  conduct in 
technology-enabled markets.36
1. Inadequacy of  Static Market Share Analysis
Under current enforcement standards, a strong, and some would say 
excessive, emphasis is placed on market shares for the purposes of  establishing 
dominance.37 This focus on market shares is even less appropriate when it 
comes to technology-enabled markets, where it is often the case that, within a 
very short time period, a fi rm hitherto seen as the dominant market player will 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2007] 
OJ L344/65, para 7.
 
36 On the analysis of  dynamic markets in general see G Sidak and D Teece, “Dynamic Compe-
tition in Antitrust Law” (2009) 4 Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 581; D Gifford and R 
Kudrle, “Antitrust Approaches to Dynamically Competitive Industries in the United States and 
the European Union” (2011) 3 Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 695. 
37 See Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359,  para 60: “Save in excep-
tional circumstances, very large market shares are in themselves evidence of  the existence of  a 
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see its market share evaporate and be demoted to an also-ran. As seen above, 
the history of  technology markets abounds with examples of  extremely rapid 
shifts in market shares. 
2. High Profit Margins Are Not in Themselves Indicative of  
Significant Market Power
As discussed above, because market shares in the technology fi eld are fi ckle, 
the fact that the market leaders will usually enjoy very high profi t margins 
should not be seen as conclusive evidence of  the existence of  market power. 
In conventional antitrust analysis, the existence of  a dominant position implies 
the ability to reap supracompetitive profi ts over an extended period of  time. 
This is evident in the SSNIP test, which in essence measures a fi rm’s ability to 
increase prices on a non-transitory basis. Likewise, the Commission takes the 
view that market entry by potential competitors can be considered suffi ciently 
swift to deter or defeat the exercise of  market power where it is likely to occur 
within the space of  two years.38
3. Prevalence of  Competitive Constraints Arising from the 
Complementary Nature of  Technological Components
By their very nature, most technological products are complements of  other such 
products. Hardware components must connect to other hardware components, 
software programs must be able to communicate with each other, devices are 
frequently required to interoperate/be interoperable. From a competition law 
standpoint, this means that the pricing freedom of  a supplier of  technology is 
often constrained by the pricing policies of  suppliers of  complementary tech-
nology.39 In its 1976 United Brands judgment, the European Court of  Justice 
(ECJ) famously defi ned a dominant position as
“a position of  economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording 
it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of  its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of  its consumers.”40
38 See  Guidelines on the assessment of  horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of  concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C31/5, para 74.
39 On the internal constraints exercised by suppliers of  complements see D Geradin and M Rato, 
“Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, 
Royalty-Stacking and the Meaning of  FRAND” (2007) 3 European Competition Journal 146; A 
Layne-Farrar, “Nondiscriminatory Pricing: Is Standard Setting Different? (2010) 4 Journal of  
Competition Law & Economics 811; B Kobayashi and J Wright, “Intellectual Property and Standard 
Setting”, ABA Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects of  Standards Setting, 2010, George Mason 
Law & Economics Research Paper No 09-40 (August 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1460997.
40 See Case 26/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207. On this issue see, eg P Akman 
and L Garrod, “When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?” (2011) 7(2) Journal of  Competition Law 
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Inevitably, this defi nition did not, and could not, foresee the increasing compet-
itive constraints represented by technological complements. However, where the 
commercial success of  a given technology and the competitiveness of  other such 
technologies are interdependent, the requirement that the allegedly dominant 
fi rm must have the power to behave independently is unlikely to be met. 
4. Technological Convergence Creates Substantial Competitive 
Constraints across Relevant Markets—Demand Side (1)
As technologies evolve, products which had hitherto satisfi ed distinct customer 
needs come to be seen as substitutes by an increasing number of  users. Examples 
of  this process include the evolving relationship between laptop computers, 
tablets, smartphones and personal digital assistants. In many cases, as a result 
of  that technological convergence,41 a fi rm occupying a dominant position in 
one relevant market will inevitably be dragged towards one or more adjacent 
markets, where it will face competition from one or more dominant fi rms.42 
5. Technological Convergence Creates Substantial Competitive 
Constraints across Relevant Markets—Supply Side (2)
The conventional framework for defi ning relevant markets is often inadequate 
to assess competitive dynamics in technology-enabled markets. In traditional 
antitrust analysis, competition authorities generally pay little attention to 
potential competition.43 However, in technology-enabled markets, the degree 
of  potential competition posed by/arising from distinct technologies disci-
plines the existing technologies through the threat of  replacement over time 
& Economics 403; L Hou, “Excessive Prices within EU Competition Law” (2011) 7 European 
 Competition Journal 47.
 
41 In 1997, the European Commission issued a “Green Paper on the Convergence of  the Telecom-
munications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation” 
(COM(97) 623, 1), where it is stated that:
“‘the term convergence eludes precise defi nition, but is most commonly expressed as: The 
ability of  different network platforms to carry essentially similar kinds of  services [for instance 
telephony not only on traditional telephone networks but also on cable TV networks], or 
the coming together of  consumer devises such as the telephone, television and personal 
computer’ [for instance advanced mobile terminals for both telephony, computing and with 
broadcast receivers].”
42 “Market dynamics may for instance be caused by technological developments, or by the conver-
gence of  products and markets which may give rise to competitive constraints being exercised 
between operators active in distinct product markets.” See Commission Recommendation of  
17 December 2007, supra n 35, para 12.
43 On potential competition see, eg P Dasgupta and J Stiglitz, “Potential Competition, Actual 
Competition, and Economic Welfare” (1988) 32(2–3) European Economic Review 569; R Gilbert, 
“The Role of  Potential Competition in Industrial Organization” (1989) 3 The Journal of  Economic 
Perspectives 107; D Bush and S Massa, “Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine” [2004] 
Wisconsin Law Review 1035.
14 Abuse of  Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets ECJ VOL. 9 NO 1
(eg laptops v tablet computers). This is because potential competitors are often 
able to enter existing markets and threaten incumbent technologies in a very 
short period of  time. This is particularly the case with intangible goods, in 
respect of  which none of  the physical constraints of  the traditional bricks-and-
mortar economy—such as capacity constraints or the availability of  physical 
inputs—are present. For instance, Microsoft Word and its rivals faced potential 
competition from a number of  other software developers before that compe-
tition became actual (in tangible form), for instance from Google Docs. Now 
Microsoft is poised to make a large range of  its word application software 
available on the internet for free.44 In practice, this means that agencies and 
courts should scrutinise potential competition from the very outset and include 
in their analysis of  the relevant market all those technologies that may replace, 
be integrated or converge with the technological product or service in question. 
This could, in certain cases, lead courts and authorities to defi ne markets as 
wide as a given technological sector.
6. The Road to Dominance May Matter
It is well established that dominance is an objective concept, and thus that 
the manner in which it was acquired should be of  no concern in an antitrust 
analysis.45 But should this always be the case, especially in circumstances where, 
as often occurs in technology-enabled markets, most—if  not all—competition 
takes place ex ante for the market as opposed to ex post in the market? Not unlike 
what happens in the conventional antitrust analysis of  bidding markets, a case 
could be made that, if  vigorous competition has taken place ex ante, then the 
market position of  the allegedly dominant fi rm is nothing but a competitive 
outcome. This should prevent a fi nding of  dominance, and the emergence of  
the ensuing special responsibility borne by dominant fi rms. 
7. IP Rights Do Not Necessarily Confer Significant Market 
Power
Competition law textbooks often state that IPR confer a monopoly on their 
owners.46 This assertion may have led generations of  students to hold the 
44 See R Waters, “Microsoft Offi ce Set to Go Free Online”, Financial Times, 10 June 2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/c836d258-74bc-11df-aed7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zMdoVbJQ.
45 See Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 91. 
46 The Court of  Justice itself  also sometimes makes similar approximations. See Joined Cases 
C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE[2008] ECR 
I-7139, para 64:
“a medicine is protected by a patent which confers a temporary monopoly on its holder, 
the price competition which may exist between a producer and its distributors, or between 
parallel traders and national distributors, is, until the expiry of  that patent, the only form of  
competition which can be envisaged”.
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mistaken belief  that the monopoly in question was akin to a monopoly position 
in the antitrust sense. That is not the case: just as with tangible property 
rights, intangible IPR does indeed confer a legal monopoly on its owner; this 
monopoly over IPR is therefore no different from one’s monopoly over tangible 
goods, which cannot be consumed by others without the owner’s consent. Yet 
this in no way endows the apparent legal monopolist with signifi cant market 
power in the economic sense. As the case may be, those others will fi nd alter-
native sources of  supply in the market place, and will be able to purchase, rent, 
own and even borrow tangible goods from other legal monopolists. The same 
holds true for IPR in technology-enabled markets: the inventions they protect 
will often compete with substitutable inventions, which may or may not also be 
protected by similar legal monopolies conferred by IPR.
8. Standards (1)
Over the last few years, the cooperative creation of  technology standards within 
formal or looser standardisation bodies,47 as well as the emergence of  de facto 
standards,48 has proved fertile ground for Article 102 claims and investigations. 
In this context, some have equated the ownership of  IPR incorporated in such 
standards with the enjoyment of  a dominant position,49 or have come close to 
doing so.50
Such a presumption is incorrect. First, many standards face competition 
not only from other standards,51 but also from non-standardised solutions. 
Secondly, all technology standards—including de facto standards—can be 
subject to potential competition from new standards and new non-standardised 
solutions, which, in the technology realm, are often quickly adopted and may 
47 Which defi ne the technical or quality requirements with which current or future products, 
production processes, services or methods may comply. See Communication from the 
Commission—Guidelines on the applicability of  Article 101 of  the Treaty on the Functioning 
of  the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1 (hereinafter 
HCG), para 257.
48 See Microsoft, supra 23, 23–28.
49 See P Chappatte, “FRAND Commitments—The Case for Antitrust Intervention” (2009) 5 
European Competition Journal 319; M Dolmans, “Standards, IP, and Competition: How to Avoid 
False FRANDs”, Fordham IP Law Institute, “Standard Setting—The Interplay with IP and 
Competition Laws”, paper presented at the 2008 Fordham IPR Conference, 12–13; German 
Federal Supreme Court, Judgment of  6 May 2009, Orange Book Standard, KZR 39/06.
50 See Case M.6381 Google/Motorola Mobility [2012] OJ C75/1, para 61:
“The Commission considers that each SEP can be considered as a separate market in itself  
as it is necessary to comply with a standard and thus cannot be designed around, ie. there is 
by defi nition no alternative or substitute for each such patent”.
51 “Certainly some standards do face competition from other cooperative efforts centered on 
different technological solutions for the same or largely similar issues”. See D Geradin, A 
Layne-Farrar and J Padilla, “The Ex Ante Auction Model for the Control of  Market Power in 
Standard Setting Organizations” (2007), 13, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=979393.
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gain immediate market traction. Thirdly, owners of  standard-essential IPR are 
constrained by the repeated-game nature of  formal standard-setting: if  they 
exercise market power with regard to one standardised technology, they risk 
being punished by standard-setting participants in future generations of  the 
same standard or in standard-setting efforts for the creation of  entirely distinct 
technology standards.52 Fourthly, owners of  standard-essential IPR are very 
frequently constrained by the need to obtain access to IPR essential to the 
same or another standard from other IPR owners.53 In such cases, it would be 
illogical to consider that one such essential IPR owner would be in a dominant 
position vis-à-vis that counterpart. One cannot be dominant and “dominated” 
at the same time within one and the same business relationship.
9. Standards (2)
Another common misconception relates to the potential relevance, from an 
antitrust standpoint, of  the supposed dichotomy between open and proprietary 
standards. It is frequently argued that open standards confer little market power 
whilst, by contrast, proprietary standards give standards owners the power to 
exclude. Again, this is not necessarily the case: many proprietary standards are 
open,54 meaning that they can be implemented by any interested third-party—
in some instances, royalty-free.
E. GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 
UNLAWFUL ABUSE IN TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED MARKETS
This section focuses on the fundamental question of  whether the substantive 
law on abuse of  dominance should be applied directly to technology-enabled 
markets or whether it should be modifi ed/tempered to take account of  the 
specifi c features of  such markets. In our view, the answer to this question is that 
there should not be a specifi c substantive law on abuse for technology enabled 
markets. In contrast to the views expressed by (some) other commentators,55 we 
consider that tailoring general legal standards to fi t different economic sectors 
or evolving market contexts is inappropriate. It undermines legal certainty and 
creates the potential for arbitrary decisions and bad law.
52 See Geradin and Rato, supra n 39, 146ff.
53 See D Geradin and M Rato, “FRAND Commitments and EC Competition Law: A Reply to 
Philippe Chappatte” (2010) 1 European Competition Journal 136. 
54 For example, the MPEG-2, DVD-Video, CD-ROM and DVD-ROM standards are open 
standards. On open standards see, eg M Glader, “Open Standards: Public Policy Aspects and 
Competition Law Requirements” (2010) 6 European Competition Journal 611. 
55 See Geradin et al, supra n 2.
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In our view, it is the application of  Article 102 itself  that requires an 
overhaul to fi nally move it from the resilient, unsatisfactory form-based analysis 
of  its early days to the much heralded, yet rarely implemented, effects-based 
approach. This need for change is particularly acute for technology-enabled 
markets because form-based legal standards (which infer likely anticompetitive 
effects from the form of  a type of  conduct under analysis) are unlikely to be 
applicable or relevant to the novel types of  conduct prevalent in technology 
markets, where the emergence of  such effects is, at best, uncertain.
The constant stream of  Article 102 complaints whereby high-tech fi rms 
accuse each other of  myriad abuses (and of  enjoying myriad dominant positions) 
illustrates how inadequate, legally uncertain and economically nonsensical the 
current legal standards on abuse of  dominance have become. One only has 
to consider the headline-grabbing commercial disputes pitting Google v Apple 
v Samsung v Microsoft v Motorola v Apple v Nokia v Microsoft v Google 
currently making its way through various antitrust agencies and the European 
Commission and a number of  courts throughout the world to understand that 
the status quo is unsatisfactory, and that the “it’s not me, it’s you” rhetoric at 
play clearly suggests that existing Article 102 standards are inadequate and/
or inappropriate. With a little imagination—and signifi cant fi nancial resources 
(which are clearly at the disposal of  the above-mentioned complainants)—
anything can be alleged and argued, because the legal standards are loose, 
undemanding and remarkably elastic. In turn, one cannot exclude that, faced 
with a stack of  complex, data-intensive cases, the Commission may be unable 
to/prevented from taking any signifi cant enforcement initiatives (leading to 
a false-negative or type II error). Those who believe in conspiracy theories 
could even suspect the complainants of  jointly trying to “trap” the agency,56 by 
clogging it up with an unmanageable number of  complaints—a strategy made 
easier under the current form-based enforcement standards. 
Against this background, we consider that the form-based analysis to which 
the European Courts continue to cling (for instance, in the Tomra ruling57) must 
fi nally be abandoned in favour of  more refi ned and more accurate (and appro-
priate) legal standards based on theories of  harm and instruments that refl ect 
widely accepted contemporary legal and economic antitrust thinking.58 Whilst 
56 See M Schinkel, “Market Oversight Games”, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working 
Paper No 2010-11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1692733.
57 See Case C-549/10P Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission, Judgment of  19 April 
2012, not yet reported; Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission [2010] 
ECR II-4361.
58 For a US view on this see T Lipsky, “Antitrust Economics—Making Progress, Avoiding 
Regression”(2003) 1 George Mason Law Review 167, available at http://www.lw.com/upload/
pubContent/_pdf/pub3990_1.pdf:
“there is no longer any serious debate in U.S. antitrust that policies and rules must be 
formulated in terms of  their ultimate effect on long-run economic performance—whether 
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it is true that some aspects of  competition law and economics remain subject 
to debate, it is no less true that the cornerstones of  the discipline lay on solid, 
consensual ground. With this in mind, several best practices can be formulated 
in relation to the concept of  abuse not only in technology-enabled markets, 
but also more generally.
First, agencies and courts should focus on exclusionary conduct as a matter 
of  priority, and treat allegations of  unlawful exploitative abuse as second-order 
priorities. This is actually in the approach advocated by the Commission itself  
in its “Guidance on its Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of  the 
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” 
(Guidance Paper), which is yet to be applied in practice, and from a theoreti-
cal standpoint this position is the necessary logical implication of  the fact that 
to condemn a fi rm for charging excessive prices is equivalent to condemning 
dominance itself. Of  course, we know all too well that, unlike agencies, courts 
do not in principle have the ability to discriminate between cases and assign to 
them distinct degrees of  priority. However, the European Courts’ case law makes 
it very clear that prices will only be found to be excessive in exceptional cir-
cumstances, where structural obstacles (eg barriers to entry, exclusive or special 
rights) are close to insurmountable. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, the 
second limb of  the United Brands59 test—which requires a comparison between 
the prices charged by the dominant fi rm and the prices of  competing products 
over time—would in all likelihood constitute a diffi cult obstacle to overcome for 
excessive pricing complaints in technology-enabled markets where such com-
parators will be ex hypothesi absent.
Secondly, with regard to allegations of  exclusionary behaviour, legal standards 
requiring proof  of  anticompetitive effects should replace, without exception, 
those legal standards with a lower evidentiary burden based on the form or 
type of  conduct under consideration. For the avoidance of  doubt, by anticom-
petitive effects we mean the foreclosure (and exit) of  existing competitors who 
are as effi cient as the dominant fi rm or the deterrence of  potential competitors 
considering/contemplating market entry.
In modern EU competition law, both types of  legal standards seem to 
jostle for a place in the assessment of  abusive behaviour. The case law of  
the European Courts, and in particular of  the ECJ, is in a state of  limbo, 
sometimes appearing to require evidence of  anticompetitive effects,60 sometimes 
that performance is measured precisely by total surplus, long-run productivity growth or some 
other objective quantity. This has greatly simplifi ed both the policy debate and the technique 
of  antitrust. To return to Baxter’s maxim, whatever the rule or policy under scrutiny, in 
modern antitrust, ‘if  it doesn’t make economic sense, it doesn’t happen’. This has been a 
powerful clarifying aid to debate at all levels of  antitrust”.
 
59 See United Brands, supra n 40, paras 250–51.
60 See Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, Judgment of  27 March 2012, not yet 
reported, paras 38 and 44:
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denying their relevance61 and, at other times, appearing to resort to an unsat-
isfactory hybrid of  these two approaches.62 In this context, courts and agencies 
across the EU appear entirely free to choose the legal standard they fi nd 
appropriate when ruling on claims of  exclusionary abuse, at least until the 
ECJ determines the issue.63 The European Commission’s approach seems 
similarly schizophrenic. The effects-based approach appears to be supported 
by the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) and 
to manifest its desire to be held to a higher standard of  proof  in Article 102 
cases, whilst the form-based approach appears to be supported by the Commis-
sion’s Legal Service. In our opinion, given the signifi cant potential for error of  
any form-based, structuralist analysis and the signifi cant costs of  those errors, 
the choice is clear.
Thirdly, a legal rule requiring mere proof  of  the likely effect of  historic conduct 
is not a proper effects-based analysis unless a probability threshold is specifi ed, 
and that threshold set at a suffi ciently high level (eg the “in all likelihood” 
standard applied in criminal law). A legal standard that attaches antitrust liability 
to conduct that is merely “liable to” or “capable of ” resulting in anticompetitive 
effects cannot be described as anything other than formalistic.
Fourthly, it is important to distinguish between the notion of  foreclosure as 
shorthand for any restriction of  rivals’ access to supplies or customers due to 
conduct by the dominant fi rm (eg through the creation of  a non-contestable 
“to the extent that a dominant undertaking sets its prices at a level covering the great bulk of  
the costs attributable to the supply of  the goods or services in question, it will, as a general rule, 
be possible for a competitor as effi cient as that undertaking to compete with those prices without 
suffering losses that are unsustainable in the long term . . . In order to assess the existence of  
anti-competitive effects in circumstances such as those of  that case, it is necessary to consider 
whether that pricing policy, without objective justifi cation, produces an actual or likely exclusion-
ary effect, to the detriment of  competition and, thereby, of  consumers’ interests.”
 
61 See Case T-219/99 British Airways plc v Commission [2003] ECR II-5917, para 293:
“for the purposes of  establishing an infringement of  Article [102 TFEU], it is not necessary 
to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned. It 
is suffi cient in that respect to demonstrate that the abusive conduct of  the undertaking in a 
dominant position tends to restrict competition, or, in other words, that the conduct is capable 
of  having, or likely to have, such an effect”.
See Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2008] ECR II-477, para 237; Case T-340/03 
France Télécom SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-107, paras 195–96, confi rmed in Case C-202/07 P 
France Télécom SA. v Commission [2009] ECR I-2369.
62 Case C-457/10 AstraZeneca v Commission, Judgment of  6 December 2012, not yet reported. 
63 For examples of  rulings suggesting that the Commission need not necessarily apply an effects-
based analysis see Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-107, para 195; 
Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, Judgment of  29 March 2012, not 
yet reported, para 268. This contrasts with the ruling issued in Post Danmark, supra n 60, para 
44. 
20 Abuse of  Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets ECJ VOL. 9 NO 1
share of  the demand by means of  exclusive purchase obligations64) from the 
proper notion of  anticompetitive foreclosure, which requires proof  that, as a 
(direct) result of  the dominant fi rm’s conduct, the existing as-effi cient com-
petitors and/or potential entrants are no longer able to act as an effective 
constraint on the dominant fi rm’s pricing.65
Fifthly, establishing an abuse of  dominance should require a high eviden-
tiary burden. In principle, proof  of  an abuse can be based on evidence that 
the conduct in question produced either actual or likely foreclosure effects. 
As noted above, however, more weight should be given to the former than 
to the latter. Only where industry data are not available or are insuffi cient 
to show the actual existence or the absence of  anticompetitive effects—as is 
often the case in nascent technology-enabled markets—will it be appropriate to 
attach antitrust liability to conduct by a dominant fi rm on the basis that it is 
likely to produce such effects. That said, as with any other legal rule that may 
encroach on fundamental rights and freedoms,66 as well as give rise to (quasi)-
criminal liability,67 it is clear that the degree of  likelihood required must be 
64 See Tomra, supra n 57, para 41:
“However, in paragraph 240 of  the judgment under appeal, the General Court properly 
approved the Commission’s reasoning that, by foreclosing a signifi cant part of  the market, the 
Tomra group had restricted entry to one or a few competitors and thus limited the intensity 
of  competition on the market as a whole.” 
65 It is obvious that such a standard deviates from some of  the more recent rulings by the ECJ. For 
instance, in Tomra, which concerned several exclusivity agreements, quantity commitments and 
individualised retroactive rebate schemes entered into by a dominant fi rm, the Court dictated 
that “competitors should be able to compete on the merits for the entire market and not just 
for a part of  it”. See Tomra, supra n 57, para 42. Taken literally, this suggests that a dominant 
fi rm may be found guilty of  an abuse as soon as it ties any share of  market demand through 
exclusive arrangements, regardless of  the magnitude of  those arrangements (eg an exclusivity 
agreement that covers 1% of  market demand, and that in turn leaves 99% of  market demand 
open to rivals, could be held unlawful). 
66 Eg the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 EU Charter), or the right to property, 
including intellectual property (Article 17 EU Charter).
67 See ECHR, 27 September 2011, A Menarini Diagnostics srl v Italy, request no 43509/08; Joined 
Cases C-201/09P and C-216/09P ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission, Opinion of  Advocate 
General Y Bot of  26 October 2010, [2011] ECR I-2239, paras 41 and 205: “While that 
procedure is not strictly speaking a criminal matter, it is none the less quasi-penal in nature”. 
See also § 205:
“I am referring, in particular, to observance of  the rights of  the defence and of  the principle 
of  the presumption of  innocence enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of  the Charter. The Court 
has repeatedly held that those fundamental rights, which are also safeguarded by Article 6 
ECHR, must be observed in all proceedings relating to infringements of  the competition rules 
capable of  leading to penalties such as fi nes or periodic penalties, although the proceedings 
in question are administrative in nature. In that regard, the Court has expressly relied on 
the nature of  the infringements in question and also on the nature and degree of  severity of  
the ensuing penalties. I am also aware that respect for those guarantees is even more funda-
mental because the proceedings in question are quasi-penal in nature, where the Commission 
carries out the investigation, conducts the proceedings and adopts the decision, and in that 
regard has a wide discretion.”
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high (as noted above, an “in all likelihood” standard). It follows that impression-
istic theories based on speculative assertions that certain behaviour is merely 
“likely”, “capable”, “liable” or “tends” to produce past or future anticompeti-
tive effects simply do not pass muster.68 
Sixthly, a core component of  any effects-based approach is the counter-
factual, the purpose of  which is to ascertain whether any observable effects 
on competition are caused by the dominant fi rm’s conduct or are due to 
extraneous factors. In abuse of  dominance cases, the applicable counterfac-
tual comprises the market in the absence of  the impugned practice. However, 
because technology-enabled markets are generally too new, such a counterfac-
tual will often be unobservable, and it will be necessary to predict what the 
market would be like had the allegedly abusive conduct not taken place. This 
analysis is fraught with diffi culties, given the scarcity of  historical industry 
data and the absence of  established business practices.69 These practical 
diffi culties, however, should not be used as a pretext to do away with this 
important analytical step and blindly ascribe any observable foreclosure 
effects to the dominant fi rm’s conduct. Rather, agencies should err on the 
side of  caution, and reject allegations of  abuse when no credible counterfac-
tual can be identifi ed, particularly as any intervention in technology-enabled 
markets risks stifl ing innovation.70 
68 See Tomra, supra n 57, para 68:
“The General Court was correct to observe, in paragraph 289 of  the judgment under appeal, 
that, for the purposes of  proving an abuse of  a dominant position within the meaning of  Article 
102 TFEU, it is suffi cient to show that the abusive conduct of  the undertaking in a dominant 
position tends to restrict competition or that the conduct is capable of  having that effect.”
69 See Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of  the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings [2009] OJ C45/4 para 21:
“When pursuing a case the Commission will develop the analysis of  the general factors 
mentioned in paragraph 20, together with the more specifi c factors described in the sections 
dealing with certain types of  exclusionary conduct, and any other factors which it may 
consider to be appropriate. This assessment will usually be made by comparing the actual 
or likely future situation in the relevant market (with the dominant undertaking’s conduct 
in place) with an appropriate counterfactual, such as the simple absence of  the conduct in 
question or with another realistic alternative scenario, having regard to established business 
practices”.
70 A possible methodology for dealing with such complex cases is to devise several counterfactual 
scenarios, assign to them distinct probability ratings (once an accurate scenario is available, its 
overall probability can be better assessed by assessing the probability of  the various microsteps 
necessary for the scenario to occur) and fi nally assess allegedly abusive market conduct under 
each counterfactual, by order of  descending probability.
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F. DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF ABUSE 
IN TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED MARKETS
In our view, the widely acknowledged diffi culty of  distinguishing between 
abusive exclusionary conduct and aggressive, pro-competitive behaviour, which 
is common to all abuse of  dominance cases, is magnifi ed in technology-enabled 
markets. The most conventional theories of  harm underpinning Article 102 
claims can, on their face, easily apply to innovative and entirely pro-competi-
tive conduct. For instance, the integration of  added functionality to a software 
application—an entirely commonplace occurrence—can easily be portrayed as 
unlawful tying. In this section, we will briefl y review different categories (or 
types) of  abusive conduct and examine the pitfalls inherent in the application 
of  the current loose legal standards to such conduct when it arises/occurs in 
technology-enabled markets.
1. Excessive Pricing
The prohibition against excessive pricing by dominant fi rms is the black sheep of  
EU competition law—and for good reason. The arguments against any attempt to 
control prices are not only well known in legal and economic theory but are also 
persuasive. Put simply, it is diffi cult to determine whether a price is excessive, and 
the risk of  an erroneous determination is that it will chill competition and invest-
ment.71 As former DG COMP Chief  Economist Lars-Hendrik Röller so aptly put 
it, “if  there were no possibility to ever exploit one’s market power, there would be 
no incentive to compete”.72 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Commission has 
hitherto shown remarkable self-restraint and has only intervened to control the 
prices charged by dominant fi rms in very limited circumstances73— predominantly 
71 See generally OECD policy roundtable “Excessive Prices”, DAF/COMP(2011) 18, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/3/49604207.pdf. See also D Evans and J Padilla, “Excessive 
Prices: Using Economics to Defi ne Administrable Legal Rules” (2005) 1 Journal of  Competi-
tion Law and Economics 97; A Ezrachi and D Gilo, “Are Excessive Prices Really Self-correcting” 
(2008) 5 Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 249. 
72 See LH Röller, “Exploitative Abuses”, Business Brief  No BB-107-002; ESMT European School 
of  Management and Technology, 2007, 5. 
73 “As regards exploitative practices, we are obviously aware that in many markets interven-
tion by a competition authority will not be necessary. We are also aware that it is extremely 
diffi cult to measure what constitutes an excessive price. In practice, most of  our enforcement 
focuses therefore as in the US on exclusionary abuses, ie. those which seek to harm consumers 
indirectly by changing the competitive structure or process of  the market. It is not in our power 
to change the Treaty. And, in my view, we should continue to prosecute such practices where 
the abuse is not self-correcting, namely in cases where entry barriers are high or even insuper-
able. It probably makes also sense to apply those provisions in recently liberalised sectors where 
existing dominant positions are not the result of  previous superior performance.” See P Lowe, 
“How Different is EU Anti-trust? A Route Map for Advisors—An Overview of  EU Competi-
tion Law and Policy on Commercial Practices”, ABA Fall Meeting, 16 October 2003. 
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as a means of  preventing dominant fi rms from artifi cially fragmenting the internal 
market.74 
Price control in technology-enabled markets, which is characteristically 
innovation-intensive, should be viewed with even more caution. Despite the 
complexity of  the relationship between innovation and market power (which 
we leave to economists far more capable than us to debate and explain75), in 
this we side with US Supreme Court Justice Scalia:
“The mere possession of  monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of  
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of  the free-
market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices — at least for a short 
period [emphasis added] — is what attracts “business acumen” in the fi rst place; it 
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive 
to innovate, the possession of  monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it 
is accompanied by an element of  anticompetitive conduct.”76
That said, one of  the arguments that is often raised to calm concerns that 
robust antitrust enforcement risks chilling innovation is that the IP laws already 
provide (or should provide) a suffi cient reward to maintain those innovation 
incentives.77 But, if  the IP laws fulfi l that role, then antitrust agencies and 
courts should be especially wary of  applying competition law to the exercise 
of  IP rights, and in particular to the price under which IP is licensed.
It is, therefore, all the more surprising that the recent strand of  cases in 
which the excessive pricing prohibition has been invoked concerns patents, and 
in the majority of  cases patents that may be essential to a technical standard. 
Indeed, the terms under which high-tech companies license their standard-
essential patents (SEPs) appear to have become the most fertile of  grounds for 
allegations and proceedings relating to excessive pricing.
Some of  these cases concerned de facto standards (for instance, the Orange 
Book Standard cases recently ruled upon by the German Federal Supreme 
74 See, eg Case C-26/75 General Motors v Commission [1975] ECR 1367, para 22; Case C-226/84 
British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission [1986] ECR 3263, para 29. As noted by Judge 
Nils Wahl,
“the prohibition against excessively high prices has its primary scope of  application in 
situations of  legal monopolies or regulated markets. In free markets it may principally be 
used when the pricing strategy focuses on something other than exploiting its customers on 
that particular product, for example by trying to prevent parallel imports”.
See N Wahl, “Exploitative High prices and European Competition Law—a Personal Refl ection” 
in A Fredenberg and N Strand (eds), The Pros and Cons of  High Prices (Konkurrensverket, 2007), 64.
 
75 See R Gilbert, “Competition and Innovation” in W Collins (ed), Issues in Competition Law and 
Policy (American Bar Association Antitrust Section, 2006).
76 Emphasis added. See Verizon Comm’ns Inc v Law Offi ces of  Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 407 
(2004).
77 See T Brennan, “Should Innovation Rationalize Supra-Competitive Prices? A Skeptical Specu-
lation” in Fredenberg and Strand, supra n 74, 92. 
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Court78 and by the District Court of  The Hague).79 The vast majority, however, 
concerned formal industry standards adopted by standard-setting organisations 
(SSOs) such as ETSI80 (for instance, the Qualcomm and IPCom investigations 
launched by the Commission).81
In some instances the antitrust liability claim was asserted by an alleged 
infringer in patent infringement proceedings before a national court (eg Apple’s 
counterclaims in multiple patent infringements suits brought by Samsung in the 
EU). In others, it was raised in complaints brought before European competi-
tion authorities by implementers of  the SEPs (for example, the investigations 
recently launched by the Commission against Samsung82 and Motorola83 
regarding those companies’ licensing practices). The argument raised by the 
implementer or prospective implementer of  the standard in question differed 
depending on whether the patent owner had committed to license his patents 
on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms or not. Where 
the patent owner had not given such a commitment, for instance because 
the standard was a de facto standard and not a formal standard adopted by 
a standard-setting body, the would-be implementer raised a so-called “com-
petition law defence”. In essence, the implementer claimed that Article 102 
imposed on the patent owner a duty to license those patents essential to the 
standard on FRAND terms and that the royalties demanded by the patent 
owner were excessive and/or discriminatory and thus in breach of  the require-
ment to license on FRAND terms.84 By contrast, where the patent owner had 
given a commitment to a standard-setting organisation that he would license 
his patents on FRAND terms, the implementer argued that the patent owner 
had breached that commitment because the royalties were excessive and/or 
discriminatory. In essence, the claim was that the alleged failure to comply 
78 See Orange Book Standard, supra n 49.
79 See District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, 17 March 2010, Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
NV v SK Kassetten GmbH & Co KG, Infringement, Joint Cases No 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 
316535/HA ZA 08-2524.
80 The European Telecommunications Standards Institute “produces globally applicable standards 
for Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), including fi xed, mobile, radio, 
converged, broadcast and internet technologies.” See ETSI webpage, “About ETSI”, available 
at http://www.etsi.org/website/aboutetsi/aboutetsi.aspx.
81 See Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Welcomes IPCom’s Public FRAND Declaration”, 
MEMO/09/549, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-549_en.htm; 
Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Initiates Formal Proceedings against Qualcomm”, 
MEMO/07/389, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-389_en.htm.
82 See Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Opens Proceedings against Samsung”, IP/12/89, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-89_en.htm.
83 See Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Opens Proceedings against Motorola”, 
IP/12/345, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-345_en.htm.
84 For a critical appraisal of  FRAND requirements see A Layne-Farrar, “Nondiscriminatory 
Pricing: Is Standard Setting Different?” (2010) 4 Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 811; M 
Mariniello, “Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for Com-
petition Authorities” (2011) 3 Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 523.
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with the FRAND commitment represented a breach of  Article 102 (this is 
sometimes referred to as “patent hold-up”).85
One of  the remarkable aspects of  all of  those cases is the absence of  a 
thorough legal analysis of  the duties owed by owners of  SEPs by Article 
102. Although the Commission investigations were closed without a decision 
(Qualcomm) or are at too early a stage at the time this article is being written 
(Samsung, Motorola), press releases,86 assorted statements87 and articles88 by 
Commission offi cials seem to indicate that the Commission will examine allega-
tions that royalties for SEPs are unreasonable under the excessive pricing legal 
standard set out by the ECJ in United Brands. The section on standardisation of  
the Commission’s Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines appears to confi rm this 
position, stating as it does that:
“In case of  a dispute, the assessment of  whether fees charged for access to IPR in 
the standard-setting context are unfair or unreasonable should be based on whether 
the fees bear a reasonable relationship to the economic value of  the IPR.”89
National courts seem to give even less regard to the analysis under Article 102. 
Although defendants in patent infringement proceedings brought by owners of  
SEPs routinely raise abuse of  dominance defences under EU competition law 
or the equivalent domestic provisions applicable in the Member State(s), those 
courts have so far limited themselves to a few vague references to the duties 
imposed by those provisions which suggest, without explaining, that Article 102 
may be relied upon to curb royalties (and other licensing terms) for SEPs.90
85 See HCG, supra n 47, §269. See also J Farrell, J Hayes, C Shapiro and T Sullivan, “Standard 
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up” (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 603; B Ganglmair, L Froeb 
and G Werden, “Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard 
Innovation” (2012) 2 The Journal of  Industrial Economics 249; M Lemley and C Shapiro, “Patent 
Holdup and Royalty Stacking” (2007) 85 Texas Law Review, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923468; E Elhauge, “Do Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking 
Lead To Systematically Excessive Royalties?” (2008) 3 Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 
535.
 
86 See Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Closes Formal Proceedings against Qualcomm”, 
MEMO/09/516, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-516_en.htm. 
See also the press releases concerning the Motorola and Samsung cases, supra n 82.
87 See Competition Commission’s press release from December 2005 on their review of  IPR 
rules at ETSI. See also J Almunia, “Keeping Markets Open and Effi cient”, SPEECH/12/172, 
presented at the European Competition and Consumer Day, Copenhagen, available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-172_en.htm.
88 See A Emanuelson, “Standardisation Agreements in the Context of  the New Horizontal 
Guidelines” (2012) 2 European Competition Law Review 69, 76. See also C Madero and N 
Banasevic, “Standards and Market Power” (2008) 5 CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2.
89 See HCG, supra n 47, §289. 
90 See eg Orange book Standard:
“The fact that the proposed licensee must have made an offer on acceptable contracting 
terms that the patent proprietor cannot refuse without discriminating the proposed licensee 
against similar companies without objective reason or without unduly obstructing him, is, to 
our knowledge, generally recognized, because the patent proprietor with a dominant position 
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In our view, the straightforward application of  the excessive pricing prohi-
bition to the terms under which an owner of  SEPs licences those patents is 
incorrect. This is not (simply) because the application of  the United Brands test 
to the price of  IPR is fraught with practical diffi culties (which it undoubtedly 
is), but because it is inconsistent with the strand of  well-established ECJ case 
law (Magill/IMS Health91), which provides that Article 102 will compel licensing 
of  IPR (or, a fortiori, limit excessive pricing) only in “exceptional circumstances 
that prevent the development of  the secondary market”, and that a dominant 
fi rm does not abuse its dominant position merely by refusing to license IPR 
for a reasonable royalty unless three cumulative conditions are satisfi ed, namely 
that such a refusal: (i) prevents the emergence of  a new product for which there 
is potential consumer demand; (ii) is unjustifi ed; and (iii) is such as to exclude 
any competition on a secondary market (the IMS Health test).92
Our thesis is very simple: if  a dominant fi rm can legitimately refuse to 
license its patents at any price, then it must surely follow that it can legitimately 
license them at any price it sees fi t. Put another way, Article 102 can only be 
relied upon to limit the royalties available to a dominant owner of  SEPs where 
Article 102 itself  has given rise to an antitrust duty to license those patents. 
This duty cannot be contractual—in other words, it cannot stem from the 
FRAND commitment given to the SSO—rather, it has to be grounded in EU 
competition law itself. And the only legal authority that is capable of  creating 
such a duty is the IMS Health case law on refusal to license.
on the market is not obliged to offer to permit the use of  the invention; only if  he declines 
an offer to conclude an agreement on non-restraining or discriminating terms, does he abuse 
his dominant position on the market. He does not have to tolerate the use of  his patent by a 
company who is not ready to enter into a license agreement on such terms and conditions” 
(our translation).
 
91 See Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR 
I-5039, para 37 and ff.; see also Joined Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P Radio Telefi s Eireann 
(RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR I-743, 
paras 49 and 50.
92 See IMS Health, supra n 91, para 52:
“Accordingly, the answer to the fi rst question must be that the refusal by an undertaking 
which holds a dominant position and owns an intellectual property right in a brick structure 
indispensable to the presentation of  regional sales data on pharmaceutical products in a 
Member State to grant a licence to use that structure to another undertaking which also 
wishes to provide such data in the same Member State, constitutes an abuse of  a dominant 
position within the meaning of  Article 82 EC where the following conditions are fulfi lled:
 – the undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer, on the market for the supply 
of  the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner of  the intel-
lectual property right and for which there is a potential consumer demand;
 – the refusal is not justifi ed by objective considerations;
 – the refusal is such as to reserve to the owner of  the intellectual property right the 
market for the supply of  data on sales of  pharmaceutical products in the Member State 
concerned by eliminating all competition on that market.” 
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At least one Commission offi cial has taken the position that the making 
of  a FRAND commitment in a standard-setting context is in and of  itself  an 
exceptional circumstance under which Article 102 will compel licensing.93 This 
argument is not very persuasive. The making of  a FRAND commitment and 
the licensing of  SEPs cannot be considered exceptional circumstances in and 
of  themselves. They are commonplace and well-understood business practices. 
Moreover, the economic and policy assumptions underlying the ECJ’s cautious 
approach to compulsory licensing are just as relevant, if  not more so, to the 
subject of  excessive pricing of  IPR. In our view, the fact remains that the 
IMS Health case law requires that the unilateral conduct by the patent holder 
excludes competition in a secondary market.
Some may be tempted to argue that the ruling by the ECJ in TeliaSonera94 
would support the view that the excessive pricing prohibition can apply to 
licensing terms and conditions offered by an owner of  SEPs who has given 
a FRAND commitment (assuming the patent owner is found to occupy a 
dominant position). The argument would be as follows. The Court held in Teli-
aSonera that a dominant fi rm’s pricing practices could be found to be abusive (in 
casu, where it was claimed they led to a margin squeeze) in the absence of  an 
antitrust duty to supply. To reach that conclusion, the Court fi rst distinguished 
margin squeeze cases from cases of  refusal to supply.95 It implied, at §25 of  its 
judgment, that a margin squeeze belongs to a distinct family of  abuse, ie those 
that impose unfair prices on customers within the meaning of  Article 102(a) 
TFEU.96 Subsequently, the Court went on to say, even more explicitly, that:
“It cannot be inferred from paragraphs 48 and 49 of  [the Bronner] judgment that 
the conditions to be met in order to establish that a refusal to supply is abusive must 
93 See Emanuelson, supra n 88, 75: 
“The argument has sometimes been raised that competition law could not intervene against 
prohibitive pricing of  IPR, or that at least competition law could not intervene absent the 
presence of  “exceptional circumstances” such as those required for a refusal to license IPR 
to be abusive. Firstly, the case law of  the European courts would not seem to require the 
presence of  such exceptional circumstances absent the very specifi c situation of  a refusal to 
license. Secondly, it is submitted that, should such “exceptional circumstances” be required, 
competition law intervention in the context of  IPR could be justifi ed by other circumstances 
than those relevant for a refusal to supply case. For example, in the Rambus case, the Com-
mission’s preliminary view was that without its “patent ambush,” Rambus would not have 
been able to charge the royalty rates in question and that, in those very specifi c (or excep-
tional) circumstances, merely exercising its patent rights could be abusive. It could also be argued 
that the mere fact of  having given a FRAND commitment (which implies a willingness to license) could also 
qualify as an “exceptional circumstance” (emphasis added).
 
94 See Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] CR I-527.
95 Ibid, paras 56ff.
96 Ibid, para 25:
“As regards the abusive nature of  pricing practices such as those in the main proceedings, it 
must be noted that subparagraph (a) of  the second paragraph of  Article 102 TFEU expressly 
prohibits a dominant undertaking from directly or indirectly imposing unfair prices”.
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necessarily also apply when assessing the abusive nature of  conduct which consists 
in supplying services or selling goods on conditions which are disadvantageous or 
on which there might be no purchaser. Such conduct may, in itself, constitute an 
independent form of  abuse distinct from that of  refusal to supply.” (emphasis added)
According to the Court, since margin squeeze and refusal to supply are two 
distinct forms of  abuse, they can be examined under different legal standards. 
This would allow a fi nding of  abuse in cases where the Bronner conditions are 
not satisfi ed, and in particular to ignore the requirement, in margin squeeze 
cases, that the input is indispensable for the customer to carry on its business. 
In our view, TeliaSonera cannot be relied upon to apply the excessive pricing 
prohibition to the terms under which IPR is licensed (and, a fortiori, SEPs 
encumbered with a FRAND commitment) for the following reasons.
First, the IMS Health standard is lex specialis for refusals to supply where 
the object of  the refusal relates to IPR.97 As such, the reasoning in TeliaSon-
era, based, as it is, on a distinction between the lex generalis on refusal to supply 
goods or services and pricing practices relating to the supply of  such goods or 
services, cannot be applied by analogy to a refusal to license IPR or the pricing 
of  such IPR. 
Secondly, and more importantly, TeliaSonera is an aberration: it lacks any 
semblance of  internal logic, and is in addition indefensible from the standpoint 
of  a cogent and modern application of  EU competition law. If  a fi rm can 
lawfully eliminate rivals by withholding the supply of  a good, how can it be 
guilty of  an abuse when it provides that good, albeit at a high price?98 Using 
97 See Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH 
& Co [1998] ECR I-7791, para 41:
“Therefore, even if  that case law on the exercise of  an intellectual property right were 
applicable to the exercise of  any property right whatever, it would still be necessary, for the 
Magill judgment to be effectively relied upon in order to plead the existence of  an abuse 
within the meaning of  Article 86 of  the Treaty in a situation such as that which forms the 
subject-matter of  the fi rst question, not only that the refusal of  the service comprised in 
home delivery be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the 
part of  the person requesting the service and that such refusal be incapable of  being objec-
tively justifi ed, but also that the service in itself  be indispensable to carrying on that person’s 
business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home-
delivery scheme” (emphasis added). 
98 This seemingly straightforward observation also appears to have befuddled Advocate-Gen-
eral Mazák in the Opinion delivered in the TeliaSonera proceedings. After admitting that “if  a 
dominant undertaking could lawfully have refused to provide the products in question, then it 
should not be reproached for providing those products at conditions which its competitors may 
consider not advantageous”, AG Mazak then goes on to state the very opposite:
“It should certainly not be inferred from my analysis in all the foregoing paragraphs that the 
prices of  a vertically integrated dominant undertaking cannot be abusive unless the input 
in question is indispensable or there is a regulatory obligation to supply that input. The 
upstream price may be excessive under Article 102(a) TFEU”.
See Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, Opinion of  Advocate General Mazák, 2 
September 2010, [2011] ECR I-527, paras 21 and 32. 
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a driving metaphor, this is akin to prohibiting speeding above 120 kph, yet 
tolerating it above 150 kph. The absurd consequence of  the TeliaSonera ruling 
is that it may induce dominant fi rms to refuse to supply competitors outright 
rather than to share their inputs with them.
Thirdly, the Commission itself  appears to have doubts as to the correctness 
of  the TeliaSonera holdings. In the IBM commitment decision, the Commission 
examined allegations that IBM had imposed “unreasonable supply conditions 
with regard to certain inputs required for the maintenance of  IBM mainframes 
on its competitors in the maintenance market, thus putting them at a com-
petitive disadvantage”99 and took the initial view that IBM’s conduct could 
amount to a constructive refusal to supply.100 However, after acknowledging the 
theoretical applicability of  the TeliaSonera ruling to IBM’s pricing practices—
which would arguably have made a fi nding of  abuse easier—the Commission 
proceeded to examine them under the Bronner standard, and considered in 
particular whether those inputs were indispensable for its rivals to compete.101
To conclude, we are of  the view that a modern application of  EU compe-
tition law grounded in logic and sound economic principles dictates that the 
prohibition of  excessive or unfair pricing contained in Article 102(a) does not 
apply to intermediate goods, but only to fi nal goods sold at the retail level to 
end-users. In the absence of  an antitrust duty to deal, a dominant fi rm should 
be entirely free to set its prices at the level it sees fi t. As the Latin aphorism 
goes, a majori ad minus.
Besides this, in a second strand of  cases the Commission developed an even 
more creative interpretation of  the excessive pricing prohibition. Those cases 
relate to so-called “patent ambush” strategies.102 In Rambus, the Commission 
99 See IBM Maintenance Services [2012] OJ C18/6, para 4.
100 Ibid, para 32:
“The Commission preliminary concluded that the cumulative effect of  the following features 
of  IBM’s behaviour with respect to the supply of  essential inputs might amount to a construc-
tive refusal to supply that could raison concerns under Article 102 of  the Treaty.”
101 Ibid, paras 37–38:
“The Court of  Justice recently held that the conditions to be met under the Bronner line 
of  case law do not necessarily apply when assessing the nature of  conduct which consists 
in supplying services or selling goods on conditions which are disadvantageous or on which 
there might be no purchaser.
However, the Commission’s preliminary view is that it would, in any case, be able to 
show that the inputs at issue here are indispensable in order to provide maintenance services 
for IBM mainframes. As explained in recitals (27) and (28), a number of  inputs required 
to provide maintenance service to IBM mainframes (such as certain LICCC-enabled parts, 
Machine Code updates and operating system PTFs) cannot be sourced outside IBM and 
are subject to specifi c sourcing conditions. Since there can be no viable substitute for these 
essential inputs, the Commission took the preliminary view that these inputs may be indispen-
sable to compete effectively with IBM on the relevant downstream market for maintenance 
for IBM mainframes.”
102 The term “patent ambush” is usually employed to describe a situation where a patent owner 
wilfully and knowingly fails to meet its duty to disclose to an SSO ownership of  patents which 
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initially expressed concerns that Rambus Inc might have abused a dominant 
position by intentionally concealing from JEDEC SSO, in which Rambus par-
ticipated, that it had patents and patent applications which were relevant to 
technology used in the DRAM standards103 being adopted by JEDEC, and 
subsequently claiming unreasonable royalties for those patents from suppliers 
of  DRAM products.104 The Commission’s view at the time was that, without 
its intentionally deceptive conduct, Rambus would not have been able to 
charge the royalties it subsequently did. The Commission indicated that under 
those circumstances Rambus’s royalties were excessive and Rambus might be 
compelled to license the patents in question royalty-free.
From a theoretical standpoint, one of  the most contentious aspects of  the 
case was that it had been the allegedly deceptive conduct—Rambus’s con-
cealment of  its patent position during the standard-setting efforts in which it 
had taken part—that had allowed Rambus to acquire a dominant position. 
In other words, the anticompetitive behaviour preceded and was the cause of  
the dominant position. However, it is a fundamental tenet of  EU competition 
law that Article 102 does not censure the acquisition, or attempted acquisi-
tion, of  dominance through anticompetitive means.105 Unlike Section II of  the 
Sherman Act, which catches monopolising practices of  non-dominant fi rms, 
Article 102 only applies to anticompetitive behaviour by fi rms that have already 
attained such a position of  dominance.
In essence, in Rambus the Commission sought to apply the excessive pricing 
prohibition to close the “enforcement gap” described by former Chief  Economist 
Röller. In short, Röller suggested that, in order to address the Commission’s 
inability to sanction conduct that leads to a dominant position, the Commission 
should apply Article 102 to the outcome of  that conduct, ie the prices charged 
by the dominant fi rm once it had acquired that dominant position—on the 
grounds that it had done so through anticompetitive exclusionary means.106
The Commission eventually closed its investigation by adopting an Article 
9 decision that rendered legally binding the commitments offered by Rambus, 
are subsequently incorporated in a standard under adoption. The fundamentally anticompeti-
tive element in a patent ambush is the deception used by the holder of  IPR to secure inclusion 
of  its patents in the standard.
 
103 Dynamic Random Access Memory is a memory chip technology. 
104 See Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Confi rms Sending a Statement of  Objections 
to Rambus”, MEMO/07/330, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-
330_en.htm.
105 See Case C-322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] 346, para 57.
106 “In other words, anticompetitive conduct that leads to a dominant position cannot be caught 
in Europe under Article 82 as an exclusionary abuse. This is enforcement ‘gap’, since it is 
precisely the way in which dominance is acquired that matters in terms of  economic effects. 
I like to suggest that antitrust enforcement through exploitative abuse can be used to close 
this important gap. That is, exploitative abuse cases should be based on acquiring a dominant 
position through anti-competitive exclusionary conduct.” See Röller, supra n 72.
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including a promise to cap the royalties that it would charge for certain patents 
essential for those DRAM products.107 It is, however, commonly accepted that 
the level at which Rambus agreed to cap its royalties was higher than that 
it could realistically have expected to obtain in the market—in other words, 
the commitment given by Rambus did not really constrain its commercial 
conduct. If  it was the case that the Commission’s apparent reluctance to 
adopt an infringement decision was due to a recognition (albeit implicit) of  
how ill-founded such an approach to the application of  Article 102 would 
be, then it should be applauded.108 In our view, to use the excessive pricing 
prohibition to sanction behaviour that occurs ex ante the acquisition of  a 
dominant position is not only a contra legem application of  Article 102, but is 
also fraught with practical diffi culties, including the need to create entirely 
new legal standards to determine the types of  conduct that should be deemed 
anticompetitive.
2. Refusal to Supply
Most allegations of  abusive refusal to supply in technology-enabled markets 
concern interoperability issues in the ICT sector. In this section, we thus 
explore the concept of  interoperability (a), review the existing case law (b) and 
shed light on a number of  misconceptions related to this issue (c).
107 See Commission’s Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission Accepts Commitments from Rambus 
Lowering Memory Chip Royalty Rates”, IP/09/1897, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-09-1897_en.htm. Of  course, the Commission considered, in its decision, that 
Rambus had occupied a dominant position since the initiation of  the impugned conduct. 
However, if  this is the case, what was Rambus’s interest in allegedly resorting to deceptive 
tactics to hide its SEPs? Moreover, the Commission also noted that there were alternatives prior 
to standardisation (§46), and that standard participants might have innovated around Rambus’s 
technology. If  this is true, this means that Rambus did not enjoy a dominant position when it 
resorted to abusive conduct.
108 A Dutch court recently reached a similar conclusion regarding claims by Apple that Samsung 
had abused a dominant position by only disclosing its ownership of  certain patents to ETSI 
after standard adoption. (“To the extent that Apple meant to argue that Samsung, as a 
result of  the late notifi cation, abused a dominant position within the meaning of  Article 24 
of  the Dutch Competitive Trading Act or Article 102 of  the TFEU this line of  reasoning 
must be dismissed. It has neither been argued nor become apparent that Samsung already 
had a dominant position within the meaning of  those provisions at the time of  the develop-
ment of  the 3G Standard. Apple only argued that Samsung obtained a dominant position 
by lending its cooperation to the establishment of  that standard whilst referring to its 
patent applications. Whatever may be of  this, Samsung rightly and undisputedly argued 
that the creation of  a dominant position has not been prohibited by article 24 of  the Dutch 
Competitive Trading Act or article 102 of  the TFEU” our translation). See District Court 
The Hague, The Netherlands, 14 March 2012, Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc et al, 
Case numbers 400367/HA ZA 11-2212, 400376/HA ZA 11-2213 and 400385/HA ZA 
11-2215.
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Fig 2 The IT Stack
Source: Commission Decision in Oracle/Sun Microsystems
(a) The Notion of  Interoperability
In the fi eld of  computer technologies, the notion of  interoperability has two 
variants.109 In the fi rst variant, there is vertical interoperability when the 
various layers of  IT infrastructure—also called the IT stack, ie hardware, OS, 
databases, middleware and application software—are able “to exchange infor-
mation and mutually use the information which has been exchanged” (see 
Fig 2).110 Vertical interoperability thus refers, for instance, to interoperability 
109 Interoperability bears resemblance with familiar concepts of  the real economy, such as “inter-
connection” in recently liberalised industries (eg in the energy, railway, postal sectors), or 
technical compatibility standards adopted within standard-setting organisations. 
110 See Council Directive 91/250/EEC of  14 May 1991 on the legal protection of  computer 
programs [1991] OJ L122/42, para 10. For more on this see A Van Rooijen, The Software 
Interface between Copyright and Competition Law (Kluwer Law International, 2010), 8.
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between the complementary components of  computer systems (eg a Samsung 
Smartphone and a Google OS).111 
A second variant of  the notion is horizontal interoperability. This refers 
to the ability of  information to be communicated across distinct technolog-
ical platforms which perform a similar function. In other words, horizontal 
interoperability is interoperability between substitute technology platforms (eg 
Windows OS and Linux OS).112
Often, interoperability is deemed procompetitive.113 Vertical interoperabil-
ity ensures that users who have chosen a particular functional component (eg 
a specifi c OS) remain free to select complementary components from several 
competing suppliers (eg of  word processing applications), and are not locked-in 
within a particular technological silo (eg all components must be sourced from 
the same supplier). By the same token, horizontal interoperability keeps tech-
nology-enabled markets open to competition. If, as is often the case as a result 
of  network effects, a particular technological standard tips the market (eg 
Windows OS), interoperability ensures that new technological platforms (eg 
Linux OS) can exert potential competition on the established de facto standard, 
as users selecting the new technology will be able to communicate with users 
of  the incumbent technology.114 
(b) The Case Law on Interoperability
For the reasons discussed above, conduct by dominant fi rms that limits, degrades 
or even prevents interoperability is usually viewed with suspicion by courts and 
agencies, and often gives rise to the initiation of  proceedings.115 Several cases 
illustrate this and shed light on the conditions under which interoperability 
degradation tactics will be considered abusive.
111 For instance, there is vertical interoperability when a user willing to listen to digital music 
selects a title within his OS musical library. The OS will in turn send the data to a media 
player. And the media player will instruct the computer’s hardware (ie the speakers) to display 
the sound. 
112 Horizontal interoperability takes place, for instance, if  a user shares—eg by e-mail or by USB 
transfer—a digital fi le with a relative who uses a different type of  media player (eg RealPlayer 
or Windows Media Player). On this see B Rotenberg, “The Legal Regulation of  Software Inter-
operability in the EU”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 07/05, footnote 25. Although encoded in 
a distinct language, the digital fi le may be played on the relative’s media player. 
113 See C Madero Villarejo, speech given at Annual Conference on European Antitrust Law, 
Brussels, 3 March 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/
sp2011_02_en.pdf, stressing “that these (interoperability solutions) favour market entry by a 
greater number of  players . . . they stimulate competition in high-tech industries.”
114 See Van Rooijen, supra n 110, 24.
115 Vertically integrated or conglomerate technology suppliers who sell complements may want to 
benefi t from so-called lock-ins. Van Rooijen notes that technology suppliers may try to prevent 
interoperability with other programs to exclude competition, and obtain a de facto exclusivity 
over a market (ibid, 10).
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(i) IBM 1984 Undertaking116
The fi rst allegations of  abusive interoperability tactics lodged before the 
Commission date back to 1980, when a number of  complainants alleged that 
IBM had failed to supply other manufacturers with the technical information 
needed to permit competitive products to be sold with IBM’s System/370 
family of  mainframe computers. The Commission opened an investigation 
and, following protracted negotiations with IBM, reached a settlement. IBM 
committed to supply interface information between or to all layers of  the IT 
stack, including: (i) System 370 hardware products; (ii) System 370 CPU and 
software products; and (iii) System 370 software products.117 Between 1 August 
1984 and July 1995, IBM received a total of  262 interoperability requests from 
24 competitors and containing 2001 individual questions.118
(ii) Microsoft I (2004)
The EU Microsoft I case of  2004 is perhaps the best example of  a vertical inter-
operability abuse. In this case, Sun Microsystems, a software producer, claimed 
that Microsoft had degraded the interoperability of  Sun’s group server OS with 
the dominant Windows OS for PCs, in order to advantage its Windows group 
server OS. As a result, Sun had been unable to attract clients to its group 
server OS, as it did not communicate well with the widespread Windows OS 
for PCs. 
The Commission found that Microsoft had abusively withheld essential 
interoperability information from Sun Microsystems.119 It held that:
“Due to the lack of  interoperability that competing work group server operating 
system products can achieve with the Windows domain architecture, an increasing 
number of  consumers are locked into a homogeneous Windows solution at the 
level of  the work group server operating system. This impairs the ability of  such 
customers to benefi t from innovative work group server operating system features 
brought to the market by Microsoft’s competitors. In addition, this limits the prospect 
for such competitors to successfully market their innovation and thereby discourages 
them from developing new products.”120
116 See IBM Personal Computer [1984] OJ L118/24.
117 Under the settlement, IBM reserved the right to make a reasonable and non-discriminatory 
charge to cover the cost of  reproduction and dissemination of  interface information supplied 
pursuant to the undertaking it made to the Commission, as well as the right to charge a 
reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty for the supply of  proprietary information protected 
by any right enforceable at law.
118 See F Lomholt, “The 1984 IBM Undertaking Commission’s Monitoring and Practical Effects” 
[1998] Competition Policy Newsletter 3, 10, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publica-
tions/cpn/cpn19983.pdf.
119 See Microsoft, supra n 23, paras 560–84.
120 Ibid, para 694.
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The Commission imposed a €497,000,000 fi ne and ordered Microsoft to 
provide rivals with detailed technical specifi cations enabling them to implement 
Microsoft’s protocol technology in their own competing server products.121 The 
Commission’s decision was subsequently challenged before the General Court 
(GC). Amongst the dozens of  interesting legal questions raised by the case, 
the GC had to determine whether the traditional ECJ case law on abusive 
refusal to deal was applicable to refusals to supply interoperability informa-
tion, possibly protected by IPRs. Under the Magill/IMS Health standard set 
out by the ECJ, the refusal by a dominant fi rm to grant IPR licences can only 
be considered an abuse in exceptional circumstances.122 As noted previously, 
a dominant fi rm does not abuse its dominant position merely by refusing to 
license IPR unless such refusal: (i) concerns a product that is indispensable for 
the production of  a “new product for which there was clear and unsatisfi ed 
consumer demand”; (ii) results in the elimination of  all of  the competition on 
the market; and (iii) has no objective justifi cation. 
In the Microsoft judgment, the GC appears to have departed from that case 
law. It held that:
“the circumstance relating to the appearance of  a new product, as envisaged in 
Magill and IMS Health . . . cannot be the only parameter which determines whether 
a refusal to license an intellectual property right is capable of  causing prejudice to 
consumers within the meaning of  [Article 102(b) TFEU]”.123
The GC added that it was suffi cient for the Commission to prove that the 
refusal to supply interoperability information gives rise to a “limitation . . . of  
technical development”.124
The GC’s judgment has sparked intense controversy amongst EU competi-
tion scholars for two reasons.125 First, it considerably lowers the threshold at 
which the exercise of  IPRs can be deemed abusive by replacing the condition 
that the refusal to supply must prevent the appearance of  a new product with 
121 Microsoft was also required to provide its competitors with licences to Microsoft’s IPRs in the 
protocols, including patents, copyrights and trade secrets covering software and the specifi ca-
tions. 
122 See Radio Telefi s Eireann, supra n 91; IMS Health, supra n 91.
123 See Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 647.
124 Ibid.
125 The Microsoft ruling is criticised, often by comparison with the prior Magil/IMS case law. See, eg 
J Kilick, “IMS and Microsoft Judged in the Cold Light of  IMS” (2004) 1 The Competition Law 
Review 23; A Devlin and M Jacobs, “Microsoft’s Five Fatal Flaws” (2009) 67 Columbia Business 
Law Review, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429574; S Sub-
ramanian, “The Microsoft Decision: A Setback to IP Rights in Europe?” (2010) 4 Journal of  
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 245; L Hou, “The Essential Facilities Doctrine—What Was 
Wrong in Microsoft?” (2012) 43(4) IIC—International Review of  Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 251 (available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2025777.
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mere proof  that it impairs “technical development”.126 Secondly, the notion 
of  conduct that limits “technical development” is inherently loose and open-
ended, and as such prone to diverging interpretation.
It is, however, questionable whether the Microsoft I ruling it still good law. 
In yet another Microsoft I ruling of  June 2012—this time related to the fi ne 
imposed on Microsoft for non-compliance with the Commission’s decision—
the GC apparently overruled its 2007 judgment and reinstated the Magill/
IMS Health standard. This judgment, which says no word of  a “limitation of  
technical development”, contains an obiter dictum where the GC explicitly refers 
to the “new product” condition, and quotes IMS Health as the sole source of  
precedent on refusals to supply involving IPRs.
“In that regard, it should be recalled that, in order for the refusal by an under-
taking which owns a copyright to give access to a product or service indispensable 
for carrying on a particular business to be regarded as abuse, it is suffi cient that 
three cumulative conditions be satisfi ed, namely that that refusal is preventing the 
emergence of  a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, that 
it is unjustifi ed and that it is such as to exclude any competition on a secondary 
market.”127
Given the EU judicature’s well-known aversion for explicit case law reversals, 
it comes as no surprise that the GC here did not clearly recognise that it 
applied a wrong legal standard in 2007.128 That said, paragraph 139 marks a 
clear and welcome evolution of  the case law on abuse, because it eradicates 
the loose, unpractical and unsound legal standard heralded in the fi rst Microsoft 
I judgment.
(iii) Apple/Virgin Mega
Several national cases also shed light on the conditions necessary to establish 
a vertical interoperability abuse. In the Apple/Virgin Mega case,129 Virgin Mega, 
a French online music provider, alleged that Apple was using its digital rights 
management (DRM) technology—a system which protects digital music fi les 
from piracy—to abusively foreclose competition, and requested interim relief.130 
Apple’s music players (ie iPods) could only read music protected by Apple’s own 
FairPlay DRM technology. Apple kept exclusive control of  the FairPlay DRM 
126 For an interpretation of  this trend according to the value of  the IPR at stake see A Van 
Rooijen, “The Role of  Investments in Refusals to Deal” (2008) 1 World Competition 63.
127 See Case T-167/08 Microsoft Corp v Commission, Judgment of  27 June 2012, not yet reported, 
para 139.
128 It thus goes on to state in the following paragraph that those three conditions were met in the 
Microsoft I case (quod non).
129 See French Council for Competition, 9 November 2004, Apple Computer v VirginMega, Decision 
no 04-D-54.
130 A DRM is a system of  technical measures which restricts the possible use of  a song/title, once 
downloaded by a music customer.
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for music sold in its online store iTunes as it did not license the FairPlay DRM 
to other online music vendors (such as Virgin Mega). The plaintiff  argued that 
competing online music stores were harmed because they were prevented from 
selling digital music to iPod users.
The French competition authority rejected all of  the allegations. Remarkably, 
it began by stressing that a number of  market characteristics militated against a 
fi nding of  dominance: dynamic and growing market, entry of  new competitors, 
downwards pressure on prices, signifi cant investments, increase in product func-
tionalities, etc. Secondly, the French authority ignored the GC’s Microsoft ruling 
and applied instead the Magill/IMS Health legal standard. On the condition 
of  “indispensability”, it found that FairPlay was not indispensable to operate 
on the online music market. Online music was not only listened to on digital 
music players. Most consumers listened to music on their PCs, and thus Virgin 
Mega could sell to music consumers other than iPod users. Moreover, iPod 
users could download music from Virgin Mega and then transfer it to their 
iPods by burning a CD. Finally, many digital music players were appearing in 
France at the time. The size of  the market addressable by Virgin was therefore 
expanding. 
Regarding the second condition of  the Magill/IMS Health test, the French 
competition authority interpreted the expression “elimination of  competition” 
as meaning “a complete elimination” of  competition. It noted that, in the case 
at hand, there was no risk of  a complete elimination of  competition. The 
market for online music downloads was considered buoyant, with six operators, 
two new entrants and numerous potential competitors.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the French competition authority added a 
fourth condition to the analysis and therefore applied a stricter standard than 
Magill/IMS Health. This is because it examined whether there was a causal 
link between the alleged abusive behaviour and the conditions of  competi-
tion observed in the market. In other words, the French competition authority 
applied the sort of  effects-based approach that we support. In the extant case, 
the agency found no evidence of  a causal link between Apple’s alleged abuse 
and Virgin Mega’s lack of  commercial success, which could be explained by a 
range of  other factors: a limited musical catalogue (350,000 v 700,000 tracks 
for Apple), ineffi cient pricing policy (€1.19 per track v €0.99 per track for 
Apple) and limited marketing expenditure.
(iv) Merger Cases
The issue of  interoperability has also triggered foreclosure concerns in the 
distinct, yet close, area of  EU merger control.131 A fi rst string of  cases concerns 
131 For a good review of  merger cases, see T Hoehn and A Lewis, “Interoperability Remedies 
and Innovation: A Review of  Recent Case Law”, mimeo, Competition Rx, 2012, available at 
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/intellectual-property-research/research.
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vertical interoperability in the ICT sector. In Oracle/Sun Microsystems,132 the 
Commission initially feared that the merged entity would degrade interoper-
ability between the widely distributed database MySQL and competing storage 
engines providers.133 During the course of  the investigation, these concerns were 
allayed on the grounds that MySQL was licensed under the most widely used 
open source licence, the General Public License v2 (GPL),134 and that Oracle 
had publicly announced that it would continue to enhance MySQL and make 
subsequent versions of  MySQL available under the GPL.135 
The Intel/McAfee case appears to have given rise to more serious concerns of  
potential degradation of  vertical interoperability.136 In this case, the Commission 
was called upon to review the acquisition by Intel, the world-leading manufac-
turer of  computer chips and chipsets, of  McAfee, a vendor of  information 
technology security (eg antivirus software). The Commission found that, post-
merger, the merged entity would have the ability and incentives to degrade 
the interoperability of: (i) rival fi rms’ security solutions with Intel CPUs and 
chipsets;137 and (ii) rival non-Intel CPUs and chipsets with McAfee security 
solutions, leading to an Intel/McAfee “security monoculture”. To dispel the 
Commission’s concerns, Intel undertook, among other things, to ensure, on 
an ongoing basis and in a timely manner, that instructions and interoperabil-
ity information for new functionalities in Intel CPUs and chipsets would be 
documented and available for use by independent security software vendors on 
132 See Case COMP/M.5529 Oracle/ Sun Microsystems, available on DG Competition’s website.
133 See CC Buhr, S Crome, A Lübbert, V Pozzato, Y Simon and R Thomas, “Oracle/Sun 
Microsystems: The Challenge of  Reviewing a Merger Involving Open Source Software” (2010) 
2 Competition Policy Newsletter 25, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/
cpn/2010_2_5.pdf:
“Oracle might have stopped offering or developing or might degrade MySQL under the GPL, 
or that Oracle might remove the constraint exerted by third-party storage engines by modifying 
the interface or refusing to grant storage engine vendors the commercial licenses that would 
allow them to market proprietary versions of  their storage engines to work with MySQL”.
134 GPL is the most widely used open source licence. One of  the characteristics of  the GPL is 
that, if  a product, which contains modifi ed or unmodifi ed MySQL source code and thus is a 
“derived work” in the sense of  copyright law, is commercialised, then it must also be licensed 
under the GPL and its entire source code must be disclosed to the public. This is sometimes 
described as the “viral” effect of  the GPL.
135 Furthermore, Oracle pledged to maintain and periodically enhance MySQL’s pluggable storage 
engine architecture to allow users the fl exibility to choose from a portfolio of  storage engines, 
including those developed by third parties. Also, Oracle pledged not to demand that third-party 
storage engine vendors obtain commercial (non-GPL) licences in order to implement the appli-
cation programming interfaces available as part of  MySQL’s architecture.
136 See Case COMP/M.5984 Intel/McAfee, available on DG Competition’s website.
137 As noted by Commission offi cials, interoperability degradation “can take several forms, such as 
non-availability of  certain hardware instructions or functions, delayed or incomplete disclosure 
of  support tools and of  information on hardware instruction sets and architecture”. See J 
Guitton, A Lübbert, I Neale-Besson and J Vidal, “Intel/McAfee” (2011) 2 Competition Policy 
Newsletter 10, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2011_2_3_en.pdf.
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a royalty-free basis.138 In addition, Intel committed not to actively impede com-
petitors’ security solutions from running on Intel’s CPUs or chipsets.139
Finally, the Commission’s decision in Cisco/Tandberg provides an example 
of  horizontal interoperability concerns.140 The Commission was called upon 
to review a merger between two suppliers of  video communications solutions 
(VCS). The Commission’s investigation focused in particular on the market 
segment for dedicated room systems (eg three-screen VCS). Because fi rms 
generally source VCS from only one supplier, a certain degree of  horizontal 
interoperability is necessary when several fi rms willing to videoconference have 
different VCS suppliers and equipment. In the Commission’s view, the proposed 
merger could have undermined horizontal interoperability between VCS. A key 
aspect of  the Commission’s concern was the fact that Cisco controlled the key 
TIP protocol for communications between Cisco’s three-screen VCS and com-
petitors’ three-screen VCS. The Commission thus feared that Cisco’s incentives 
to interoperate might change post-merger. The Commission noted that, whilst 
Cisco would probably keep an incentive to interoperate with its main competi-
tors, it would have increased incentives to strategically degrade interoperability 
with new entrants or less important competitors.141 To address the Commis-
sion’s concerns, Cisco committed, inter alia, to divest the rights attached to its 
proprietary protocol TIP to an independent industry body.142
138 Ibid, 11.
139 Interestingly, issues of  vertical interoperability also arose in sectors alien to ICT, such as medical 
systems sold to hospitals. In Siemens/Drägerwerk [2003] OJ L291/1 the parties transferred to a 
joint venture their respective activities in patient monitors on the one hand, and in ventilators 
and other medical equipment on the other hand. With this joint venture, the Commission feared 
the creation of  a technological silo. In particular, the joint venture could have sought to give 
preference to Siemens’s patient monitors by withholding the interface information necessary for 
competitors’ monitors to be able to interface with the ventilators and other relevant equipment 
sold by the joint venture. This would have led to a reduction in the choice of  patient monitors 
for hospitals, as well as price increases. To dispel the Commission’s concerns, the parties agreed 
to provide the necessary electrical and mechanical interface for rivals’ patient monitors to be 
able to interoperate with its own equipment used in operating theatres and intensive care 
units. A similar issue arose in GE/Instrumentarium [2004] OJ L109/1. The Commission feared 
that, post-merger, GE could favour its own critical care and perioperative patient monitors, 
as well as its clinical information system, by withholding the interface information necessary 
for competitors’ own systems to interoperate with the anaesthesia delivery systems and other 
relevant equipment sold by the merged entity. Remedies analogous to those accepted in Siemens/
Drägerwerk were imposed to allay the vertical interoperability concerns.
140 See Case COMP/M.5669 Cisco/Tandberg, available on DG Competition’s website.
141 Ibid, §81.
142 It also committed to ensure interoperability with Cisco’s solutions and to allow other vendors 
to participate in the development and in the updates of  such protocol.
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(v) Pending and Upcoming Cases
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of  cases involving claims of  abusive 
interoperability tactics.143 The ongoing mega-investigation against Google is a 
good example of  this. One of  the main allegations in that case is that Google 
has downgraded rivals’ interoperability with its services through a range of  
abusive tactics.144 First, since the acquisition of  the website www.youtube.com 
(which hosts video clips), Google would have adopted technical measures to 
restrict competing search engines from properly indexing youtube.com links 
on search results pages. Secondly, Google would have refused to allow mobile 
telephones running Microsoft’s new Windows Phone OS to access YouTube 
metadata in the same way as Android telephones and iPhones do.145 Thirdly, 
Google would have contractually prohibited advertisers from using their data 
in an interoperable way with other search advertising platforms (such as Micro-
soft’s adCenter).146
More recently, the Commission opened a formal investigation against 
MathWorks following allegations of  abusive interoperability tactics.147 
MathWorks designs and sells mathematical computing software. Two of  its 
software products, Simulink and MATLAB, are used by engineers in the 
car industry to design control mechanisms for automotive vehicles (eg cruise 
control systems, anti-lock braking systems (ABS) and parking controls). The 
Commission is examining whether MathWorks rejected a rival software fi rm’s 
request for end-user licences and interoperability information. The Commission 
seems concerned that MathWorks sought to prevent that rival from reverse 
engineering MathWorks products and, in turn, designing competing software 
useful to the automotive industry. It should be noted that the purpose of  reverse 
143 This is all the more surprising, given that the Commission seems itself  a little lost in the jungle 
as regards interoperability (it does not know what to favour or the extent of  the problem). See 
“Public Consultation on the Access to Interoperability Information of  Digital Products and 
Services”, available at http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch?form=Interoperabi
lity&lang=EN.
144 See the Microsoft blog post talking of  a “broadening pattern of  walling off  access to . . . data 
that competitors need”: B Smith, “Adding our Voice to Concerns about Search in Europe”, 
Microsoft on the Issues, 30 March 2011, available at http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_
the_issues/archive/2011/03/30/adding-our-voice-to-concerns-about-search-in-europe.aspx.
145 Google has enabled its own Android phones to access YouTube so that users can search for 
video categories, fi nd favourites, see ratings, and so forth in the rich user interfaces offered by 
those phones. It has done the same thing for the iPhones offered by Apple, which does not offer 
a competing search service. But Microsoft’s YouTube “app” on Windows Phones is basically 
just a browser displaying YouTube’s mobile website, without the rich functionality offered on 
competing phones.
146 In a recent speech, the Commissioner for Competition, however, suggested that only this latest 
interoperability allegation could give rise to serious doubts of  abuse. See “Statement of  Vice-
President Almunia on the Google Antitrust Investigation”, supra n 25.
147 See Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Opens Proceedings against MathWorks”, 
IP/12/208 (1 March 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-208_
en.htm. 
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engineering is to reproduce another fi rm’s software and is wholly lawful.148 It 
can be achieved through one of  two different methods. One method consists 
in observing what the software does in order to reconstruct how it does it 
(so-called “black box testing”). The other method consists in decompiling the 
observable software object code (an obscure list of  binary 1s and 0s) into 
source code (a humanly readable set of  instructions). In this second variant, 
reverse engineering can only take place if  the software’s object code is available 
(so-called “white box testing”).149 But this is not suffi cient, and decompiling 
will often be complex and costly. The Commission’s concern seems to focus 
on the risk that MathWorks has prevented rivals from analysing Simulink and 
MATLAB’s object code.150
Interoperability issues are also at the heart of  an ongoing complaint lodged 
by Versata, a US software producer, against SAP, the leading supplier of  business 
management software.151 Versata alleges that SAP has manipulated interfaces in 
order to undermine the interoperability of  SAP’s Enterprise Resource Planning 
applications with Versata’s Pricer software. 
Finally, interoperability is a bone of  contention in the annulment proceed-
ings introduced by Cisco Systems against the Commission’s decision approving 
the Microsoft/Skype merger.152 In its application, Cisco argues that, with access to 
the large mass of  Skype users (several hundred million), Microsoft will seek to 
create a preferential interoperability link with its Lync applications for unifi ed 
communications services (eg instant messaging, telephony, videoconferencing).153 
According to Cisco, customers of  unifi ed communications services will logically 
choose Lync over rival unifi ed communications services simply because it will 
be the sole software interoperable with Skype’s large installed base.
(c) Misconceptions on Interoperability
The increase in the number of  recent interoperability abuse cases makes it 
important to dispel a number of  misconceptions regarding interoperability. 
148 See Van Rooijen, supra n 110, 18.
149 Source code, in contrast, is often protected by copyrights, and thus not freely accessible.
150 See Commission’s Press Release, “Commission Opens Proceedings against MathWorks”, supra 
n 147.
151 See M Tricker and M Waha, “Antitrust and Technology in Europe and Asia: Microsoft on 
the Attack—Google under Investigation”, available at http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/
publications/33109/antitrust-and-technology-in-europe-and-asia-microsoft-on-the-attack-google-
under-investigation; F Mueller, “Versata Complains against SAP: Patent Aggressor Demands 
Interoperability, Requests Antitrust Intervention”, Foss Patent, 30 June 2010, available at http://
www.fosspatents.com/2010/06/versata-complains-against-sap-patent.html.
152 See Case COMP/M.6281 Microsoft/ Skype, available on DG Competition’s website. See also 
the appeal brought against this decision. Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission 
[2012] OC C109/31, action brought on 15 February 2012.
153 Microsoft will in contrast allegedly degrade interoperability with rival software for unifi ed com-
munications. 
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First, the contribution of  interoperability to welfare remains wholly unclear. 
Whilst, at fi rst blush, interoperability seems to foster competition, the reality is 
much more complex.
(i) Misconception No 1
On the one hand, there may be an erroneous presumption that markets where 
products are not interoperable are insuffi ciently competitive. Although in such 
markets consumers may tend to choose the product with the highest number 
of  users (due to positive externalities), and the market may subsequently “tip” 
towards that product, this does not mean that such markets are not competi-
tive. In such cases, competition takes place ex ante, for the tipped monopolistic 
market position. Also, whilst ex post competition may be reduced, some markets 
often take a long time to tip in favour of  one allegedly dominant fi rm (and 
some never do). Moreover, in markets with non-interoperable technologies, 
vigorous ex post competition may—and will—often arise out of  disruptive 
technologies or drastic innovations, with new players innovating around the 
monopoly, and displace the process of  competition towards other products. 
This is the well-known process of  dynamic creative destruction introduced by 
Schumpeter.154
Conversely, markets where products are interoperable are all too often 
deemed competitive. In such markets, however, fi rms’ ex ante incentives to 
compete on drastic innovations may be reduced by the necessity to ensure 
interoperability. Firms will thus rather compete in the market within a similar 
technological ecosystem. The process of  competition in turn will take place ex 
post, through the introduction of  incremental innovations, whose contribution 
to welfare will be much less than that of  disruptive innovations. 
All in all, neither of  those two models of  competition can be said to be 
better than the other. From a competition policy standpoint, this implies that 
courts and agencies should not blindly favour interoperability in all cases 
(some agencies seem to be real interoperability addicts) as that would mean 
an unfounded bias in favour of  incremental innovation and against drastic 
innovation.
(ii) Misconception No 2
Technological interoperability is polymorphous. The fact that a company will 
limit the interoperability of  the technology it supplies does not necessarily mean 
that those products will not be able to interoperate at all with products supplied 
by rivals. The supplier of  an OS (eg Microsoft and its Windows OS) may 
choose not to make its OS vertically interoperable with complementary appli-
cation software products designed by competitors (eg Apple word-processing 
154 See J Schumpter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper, 1975). 
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applications cannot be installed on Windows), yet ensure horizontal interop-
erability with a substitutable rival OS (eg Windows for PC and Apple iOS 
communicate, allowing users of  both OS to exchange data, emails, documents, 
etc) and vice versa.
(iii) Misconception No 3
Reverse engineering can transform non-interoperable, closed technological 
platforms into open ones. For instance, it has often been reported that Real 
Networks reverse engineered Windows Media Player or Apple’s DRM, thereby 
fostering competition in online music and triggering market entry.155 The 
procompetitive effects of  reverse engineering, and in particular of  black box 
testing, are often underestimated. As a matter of  best legal practice, courts 
and agencies should scrutinise the scope for reverse engineering prior to inves-
tigating any allegation of  abusive interoperability tactics. 
(iv) Misconception No 4
Attempts to ensure interoperability on the basis of  the antitrust laws usually 
produce complex remedies which require courts and agencies to play roles best 
left to engineers and/or marketing managers. The Microsoft case illustrates this 
point. Once the Commission had found an infringement, a remedy ensuring 
adequate interoperability conditions with rival OS for servers rivals had to be 
crafted. To make its life as easy as possible, the Commission took the view that 
it was not its role to tell Microsoft how to comply with its decision and eliminate 
the abuse. It thus delegated to Microsoft the duty to devise an appropriate 
technical and commercial remedy. This, in turn, triggered an endless discussion 
between Microsoft and the Commission on the appropriate technical (adequate 
level of  technical documentation) and commercial conditions (eg licensing fees) 
for the disclosure of  Windows’ specifi cations.156 It ultimately took Microsoft 
over three years to propose and implement a remedy deemed suitable by the 
Commission. On top of  this, a specifi c monitoring mechanism (eg appointment 
of  a trustee, reporting duties, penalty payments) had to be set up to ensure 
that Microsoft would comply over time with the remedial order.157 For these 
reasons, we consider that the courts are ill-equipped to engage in these types 
of  protracted, heavy-handed regulatory endeavours.
155 See Van Rooijen, supra n 110, 18.
156 This matter is not over, and is currently subject to litigation before the General Court. 
157 Ibid. Finally, it may well be the case that the company has not kept the information necessary 
to interoperate, as often software companies do not document well their technological innova-
tions (object and source code).
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(v) Misconception No 5
Allegations of  abusive failure to disclose interoperability information are often 
overly broad, and request the disclosure of  information that goes beyond the 
interface specifi cations strictly necessary to interoperate. It will often be the case 
that not all of  the dominant fi rm’s technology and product design information 
would have to be disclosed to ensure interoperability.158 Courts and agencies 
should restrict the scope of  any disclosure order to the strict minimum, and 
avoid mandating the disclosure of  information protected by IP rights unless 
it has been shown that such disclosure is essential to ensure interoperability.159
3. Tying
(a) Introductory Remarks
The integration of  complementary products, frequent in technology-enabled 
markets, makes them particularly prone to allegations of  unlawful tying. This 
is nowhere more evident than with software, in respect of  which integra-
tion is often costless, as illustrated by the two investigations launched by the 
Commission against Microsoft in the past decade. As the CFI recognised in 
Microsoft I,
“The IT and communications industry is an industry in constant and rapid evolution, 
so that what initially appear to be separate products may subsequently be regarded 
as forming a single product, both from the technological aspect and from the aspect 
of  the competition rules.”160 
Following the GC’s Microsoft I ruling, the legal standard under which allegations 
of  unlawful tying will be assessed appears to be well established. Tying will be 
deemed abusive if  four cumulative conditions are satisfi ed:161
158 As noted by a Commission offi cial in an Article following the IBM 1984 undertaking:
“the U/T did not oblige IBM to disclose product design information. This was acceptable to 
the Commission which throughout the formal proceedings had argued that interface specifi ca-
tions do not reveal the design of  the products concerned. As the U/T did not oblige IBM to 
disclose product design information it would not seem to have removed IBM’ s incentives to 
improve its products and to offer the best ones available in the marketplace because if  IBM 
succeeded in doing that customers would address themselves to IBM. The U/T therefore 
not only stimulated competition in that it removed a major obstacle for IBM’s competitors 
to offer innovative System/370 products at an earlier moment in time than they could have 
done in the absence of  the U/T, if  at all, but also because of  this reinforced competition it 
put pressure on IBM to innovate and improve upon its own products”.
See Lomholt, supra n 118, 10. 
159 Not all interoperability information is protected by IPRs, especially in the software industry. 
Courts should apply the Magill and IMS Health standards to cases involving IPRs, and rely on 
the lesser Brönner standard for non-IP protected interface information.
160 See Microsoft, supra n 123, para 914.
161 Ibid, para 844.
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1. fi rst, the tying and tied products are two separate products;
2. secondly, the undertaking concerned is dominant in the market for the tying 
product;
3. thirdly, the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product; and
4. fourthly, the practice in question forecloses competition.162
The interpretation of  the second and fourth conditions does not raise particular 
issues in technology-enabled markets. By contrast, the notion of  “separate 
products” contained in the fi rst condition, and the element of  coercion required 
by the third condition are fertile grounds for debate.163
(b) Separate Products
In its Guidance Paper, the Commission states that
“Whether the products will be considered by the Commission to be distinct depends 
on customer demand. Two products are distinct if, in the absence of  tying or bundling, 
a substantial number of  customers would purchase or would have purchased the 
tying product without also buying the tied product from the same supplier, thereby 
allowing stand-alone production for both the tying and the tied product.”164
The Commission thus appears to recognise that two products will be considered 
separate for the purposes of  a tying claim only if  there is separate consumer 
demand for both the tying and the tied product. The existence of  separate 
customer demand for the tied product alone would merely represent a necessary, 
but not a suffi cient, condition. There should also be separate demand for the 
tying product. In addition, the reference to “stand-alone production” should 
be interpreted as meaning stand-alone production for which there is customer 
demand.165
Unfortunately, the Guidance Paper then goes on to state that “evidence 
that two products are distinct could include . . . indirect evidence, such as 
the presence on the market of  undertakings specialised in the manufacture or 
sale of  the tied product without the tying product”. This seems to contradict 
162 Ibid, para 842.
163 On tying law see, eg I Lianos, “Tying and Bundling as a Leveraging Concern under EC Com-
petition Law” (2009) 1 World Competition 144; S Liebowitz and S Margolis, “Bundles of  Joy: The 
Ubiquity and Effi ciency of  Bundles in New Technology Markets” (2009) 1 Journal of  Competition 
Law & Economics 1.
164 See Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82, supra n 69, 
para 51.
165 This view appears to be confi rmed by the Technology Transfer Guidelines, where the 
Commission states that for tying to occur, “it is a condition that the products and technologies 
involved are distinct in the sense that there is distinct demand for each of  the products and 
technologies forming part of  the bundle”. See Commission Notice—Guidelines on the appli-
cation of  Article 81 of  the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements [2004] OJ C101/2, 
para 191.
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the initial assertion that it is necessary to establish the existence of  separate 
demand for the tying product alone, and has the potential to lead to absurd 
results, especially in technology products. It is perfectly possible for there to 
be separate demand for the tied product without the tying product, but no 
separate demand for the tying product without the tied product. In particular, 
as products evolve to include new functionalities (sometimes in the hundreds), 
it is often the case that there will remain for some time stand-alone demand 
for, and production of, the tied product despite the fact that consumers will 
no longer purchase the allegedly tying product without the allegedly tied 
functionality. For instance, consumer demand for a device that kept track of  
contact details, meetings and the like used to be satisfi ed by what was known 
as a personal digital assistant (PDA). Over time, mobile telephones began to 
integrate those functions, and nowadays it is unlikely that there is independ-
ent consumer demand for a smartphone without those functionalities—despite 
the fact that there may remain demand for, and a stand-alone supply of, such 
PDAs.
(c) Coercion
As noted above, a fi nding of  abusive tying presupposes that the dominant fi rm 
does not give its customers the option of  obtaining the tying product without 
the tied product.166 Put simply, the dominant fi rm must coerce customers 
wishing to purchase the tying product into also purchasing the tied product. 
In the Microsoft I case, the Commission and the GC found clear evidence that 
Microsoft had coerced customers that required Windows—suppliers of  PCs—
into also obtaining Windows Media Player (WMP). That fi nding hinged on the 
fact that Microsoft only supplied a version of  Windows that included a pre-
installed WMP—Microsoft did not offer Windows without WMP.167 The GC 
held that the fact that consumers were unable to acquire the tying product 
without simultaneously acquiring the tied product was suffi cient for it to be 
satisfi ed that there had been coercion.168
As a matter of  economics, the problem with coercion is twofold. First, 
coercion may result in customers of  the dominant fi rm acquiring supplemen-
tary products which they do not need at all. For instance, a customer may 
not need a warranty for a new PC but be forced to purchase one because the 
manufacturer does not sell PCs without such a warranty. In antitrust terms, 
this would be an issue of  exploitation. Secondly, coercion may restrict the 
customer’s freedom to choose between different supplementary products which 
166 See Microsoft, supra n 123, para 955. Customers must be deprived of  the “realistic choice of  
buying the tying product without the tied product”.
167 Ibid, para 946.
168 Ibid, para 961.
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it does need to acquire.169 As a result of  coercion, the customer is automatically 
directed to, or locked into, the dominant fi rm’s tied product at the expense of  
rival products. In antitrust terms, this would be an issue of  exclusion. Customers 
who must take the tied products supplied by the dominant fi rm forego resources 
(eg money, space) which could be allocated to substitute products supplied by 
competitors. In Hilti, the Commission found that the tying of  nail cartridge 
strips used in nail guns and nails was abusive.170 Customers who had been 
compelled to acquire the dominant fi rm’s (tied) nails were held to have foregone 
their freedom of  choice regarding the source of  supply of  those nails which, in 
turn, resulted in the exclusion of  independent nail suppliers. Importantly, this 
type of  coercion can only arise if  the tied product is a rivalrous good or, in 
other words, a product whose acquisition prevents or limits the acquisition of  
other, substitutable, products (notably those offered by rivals).171
In technology-enabled markets, and in particular with regard to information 
goods such as software and internet-based services, however, the exploitative or 
exclusionary consequences of  coercion will often not occur. That is because 
many of  those products are not rivalrous in consumption (eg because they are 
supplied free of  charge, or because space constraints are non-existent).
Viewed under this light, the Commission’s tying decisions against Microsoft 
are wrong. In those cases, Microsoft’s customers could not have been coerced 
because media players and internet browsers are non-rivalrous goods which are 
distributed for free.172 Due to the possibility of  multi-homing, ie the ability for 
customers to acquire, install and use several internet browsers/media players 
on a single PC,173 the freedom of  choice of  Microsoft’s customers was never 
undermined. In addition, from a technical perspective, the limited fi le size 
169 The rulings of  the EU courts in Hoffmann-La Roche and Hilti cast light on this issue. The 
judgments of  the Community courts are replete with references to the fact that coercion entails 
a restriction of  customers’ freedom of  choice. In Hoffmann-La Roche, for instance, the ECJ held 
that the dominant fi rm tied its customer in a way to “[d]eprive the purchaser or restrict his 
possible choice of  sources of  supply and to deny other products access to the market” (Hoff-
mann-La Roche, supra n 45, para 60). 
170 See Eurofi x-Bauco [1988] L65/19.
171 We slightly stretch the classic defi nition of  a rivalrous good. Traditionally, rivalry relates to a 
situation where “Everyone technically can use the good, but the use of  the good by one person 
detracts from the ability of  others to enjoy the good”. See J Taylor and A Weerapana, Economics 
(South-Western College Publication, 6th edn, 2009), 435. We shift from a situation where the 
use of  one good limits the ability of  another person to use that same good, to a situation where 
the use of  one good limits the ability of  that same person to use another good.
172 On its side, the Commission stated that monetary sacrifi ce was not a requirement for the 
establishment of  a tying abuse because “the wording of  paragraph (d) of  Article 82 does not 
include a reference to “paying” when introducing the element of  a ‘supplemental’ obligation”. 
See Microsoft, supra n 23, para 831. This brings some perspective with the General Court’s odd 
assertion that consumers had to pay an extra fee for WMP included in the total price of  the 
Windows OS. See Microsoft Corp v Commission, supra n 123, paras 967–68.
173 See J Tirole, “The Analysis of  Tying Cases: A Primer” (2005) 1 Competition Policy International 
12:
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of  most internet browsers and media players, as well as the development of  
cloud computing, meant that the volume of  hard disk space required to store 
additional software became increasingly trivial.
Of  course, it could be argued that, rather than end-users, Microsoft had in 
fact coerced OEMs (PC manufacturers) to purchase a bundle comprising WMP 
and Internet Explorer. Those OEMs, however, were not subject to any sort of  
technical coercion, given that Windows worked perfectly with rival internet 
browsers and media players. Moreover, there was no contractual coercion, 
because OEMs remained free to change the default settings on PCs and install 
rival software programs.
The Microsoft decisions thus appear to be inconsistent with conventional 
tying law founded on traditional industrial organisation considerations. On 
closer examination, these decisions show how behavioural economics can 
be used to construe novel theories of  harm. Behavioural economics suggests 
that dominant fi rms may leverage market power absent coercion simply by 
exploiting customers’ biases.174 In the Microsoft decisions, the Commission found 
that the pre-installation of  WMP and Internet Explorer on Windows was 
conducive to leveraging because of  “end-users’ inertia”.175 The Commission 
argued that users did not switch to rival software products which they could 
easily and freely download because they faced obstacles such as searching, 
choosing and installing a competing software application, which could stem 
from a lack of  technical skills which users could not overcome.176 In Microsoft 
II, the Commission relied on empirical analyses to confi rm its fi ndings. A 
consumer survey showed that a majority of  users (51%) had not downloaded 
alternative browsers.
“[I]n a two-sided market in which the cost of  multi-homing for users facing the tie is small, 
the tie on that side of  the market need not preclude competitors from profi tably competing, 
even when competitors’ technology is undifferentiated from the tied technology from their 
point of  view”.
See also J Gabszewicz and X Wauthy, “Two-Sided Markets and Price Competition with Multi-
homing”, mimeo (Université Catholique de Louvain, 2004), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/
cor/louvco/2004030.html. In a multi-homing market, there is a priori no reason why a buyer 
should choose to acquire a single product only, at the exclusion of  the other.
 
174 See M Bennett, J Fingleton, A Fletcher, L Hurley and D Ruck, “What Does Behavioral 
Economics Mean for Competition Policy?” (2010) 1 Competition Policy International 121:
“Behavioral economics suggests that even small switching costs can have signifi cant effects 
on consumer behavior in the presence of  consumer inertia, endowment effects, and default 
bias. This can, in turn, make foreclosure more likely to occur through tying and bundling.”
According to behavioural economics, dominant fi rms may also leverage market power absent co-
ercion, simply by exploiting customers’ intrinsic biases, such as inertia, hassle costs, availability 
heuristics and risk aversion. 
175 See Microsoft, supra n 23, para 870.
176 Ibid, paras 866, 869 and 870; Case COMP/39.530 Microsoft (tying) [2010] OJ C36/7, para 48.
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Because demand in technology-enabled markets often consists of  end-users, 
it is possible that behavioural economics will be found attractive by antitrust 
courts and agencies. However, theories such as the ones put forward by the 
Commission in the Microsoft cases are, in our view, dangerous. First, they are 
based on empirical surveys of  user behaviour, which gives rise to “framing” 
concerns (in other words, concerns that the results will be affected by how 
questions are asked).177 Secondly, the use of  behavioural theories of  harm raises 
a more fundamental issue, which can be described as one of  imputability (or, in 
economists’ jargon, an identifi cation problem).178 This can be illustrated by the 
cases against Microsoft, which in essence were not so much about a dominant 
fi rm seeking to abusively coerce customers as about those customers’ inability 
to make optimal choices due to their own intrinsic biases. One may question 
the appropriateness of  laying the blame exclusively on the dominant fi rm in a 
case where any foreclosure of  rivals is due to customers’ lack of  interest in the 
products themselves. By way of  comparison, in other concentrated sectors, such 
as retail banking, where the degree of  competition is weak due to consumer 
switching rigidities, competition authorities have cautiously refrained from sanc-
tioning companies through recourse to the competition rules. Rather, other 
instruments (such as consumer law) are used to foster the mobility of  retail 
banking customers.179
4. Predatory Pricing180
A plethora of  technology-enabled products/services are given away for free by 
their suppliers. The ICT sector offers countless illustrations of  this phenomenon. 
Email services, video and musical content (eg youtube.com, dailymotion.com), 
news (eg most newspapers websites), horizontal web-searching services (eg 
google.com and bing.com), vertical web-searching services (eg travel tickets 
searches), social network accounts (eg Facebook, Linkedin and Twitter profi les), 
software and applications of  all sorts (eg video games, offi ce tools), data storage 
177 People provide different answers when the same questions are presented in different ways. See A 
Tversky and D Kahneman, “The Framing of  Decisions and the Psychology of  Choice” (1981) 
4481 Science 453; M Salinger, “Behavioral Economics, Consumer Protection and Antitrust” 
(2010) 1 Competition Policy International 71.
178 On this see N Petit and N Neyrinck, “Back to Microsoft I and II: Tying and the Art of  Secret 
Magic” (2011) 2 Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice 117. On legal grounds, competi-
tion rules target fi rms’ misconduct in the market place.
179 If  nudging customers may be the sole solution to open markets, consumer law may be a more 
appropriate tool than competition law to achieve that aim. See E Garcès, “The Impact of  
Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition Policies” (2010) 1 Competition Policy Inter-
national 150, which stresses that remedial interventions may generate ineffi ciencies. 
180 A number of  papers have also alluded to other non-price predation strategies in innovation 
markets, such as the introduction of  genuine innovations to harm rivals, and predatory systems’ 
rivalry strategies that seek to introduce product systems incompatible with those of  rivals. See J 
Ordover and R Willig, “An Economic Defi nition of  Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation” 
(1981) 91 Yale Law Journal 8.
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services (eg dropbox.com), blogging platforms (eg Typepad, Wordpress) etc are 
all provided to users for free. 
From a competition law standpoint, free products look, on their face, 
suspicious. After all, a dominant supplier who gives away products for free 
seemingly engages in the worst possible form of  predatory pricing (a worse 
form of  predation may possibly consist in paying customers to purchase, a 
practice that can be labelled “negative pricing”). For each product/service 
supplied, the price tag is zero. Without even considering this pricing policy 
under the AKZO181 benchmarks (in particular, the rule that prices below average 
variable costs are presumably unlawful),182 one can jump to the conclusion that 
the dominant fi rm necessarily incurs a loss on every unit sold. Such sacrifi ce 
could be seen as irrational and likely, under traditional antitrust analysis, to 
foreclose as-effi cient rivals.183
Such an application of  the conventional predatory pricing framework to 
the ICT sector would be overly simplistic. The fact that no price is charged 
to consumers does not mean that no price is charged at all, or that none of  
the dominant fi rm’s costs are recouped. In two-sided markets the price of  the 
service offered to customers present on one side of  the market is charged to 
customers present on the other side of  the market, and costs are recovered 
in that way. For instance, Facebook’s social network services are offered for 
free to their users because Facebook generates revenue from advertisers that 
place display advertisements on Facebook’s web properties.184 This business 
model is not specifi c to technology-enabled markets. Many bricks-and-mortar 
companies also rely on two-sided monetisation techniques. For instance, some 
daily newspapers are given away for free because they rely entirely on adver-
tising. More generally, cross-subsidisation in conglomerate fi rms (where certain 
customer segments fi nance the purchases made by other segments) or the 
provision of  public goods by the state (where some taxpayers fi nance part of  
the benefi ts provided to others) respond to the same logic. Two-sided markets, 
however, are more common in the high-tech fi eld. That said, not all technol-
ogy-enabled markets are two-sided. Most hardware products (eg computers, 
chipsets), for instance, are paid for by their direct users.
181 Supra n 37, para 71.
182 As apparently refi ned in Post Danmark, supra n 60. For fi rst comments on this decision see S 
Barazza, “Post Danmark: The CJEU Calls for an Effect-based Assessment of  Pricing Policies” 
(2012) 3 Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice 466; R Subiotto and D Little “The Appli-
cation of  Article 102 TFEU by the European Commission and the European Courts” (2012) 
3 Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice 175.
183 See Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82, supra n 69, 
para 63.
184 On the diffi cult assessment of  the relevant market for online advertising see J Ratliff  and D 
Rubinfeld, “Online Advertising: Defi ning Relevant Markets” (2010) 3 Journal of  Competition Law 
& Economics 653.
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Moreover, the fact that no price is charged for a particular service does not 
mean that no price will be charged to all customers. Often, in technology-ena-
bled markets, fi rms resort to so-called product/service versioning:185 customers 
will only pay a price if  they use certain premium services with additional 
features (eg LinkedIn Business, Business Plus and Executive profi les). The basic 
service is offered for free as a sample, demo or loss-leader to entice users to 
discover the service and, in turn, induce them to migrate to the high-end 
service (a common business practice in computer programs, video games, etc). 
As noted by Chris Anderson, the author of  the bestselling book The Long Tail:
“One of  the most common business models on the internet, from Skype to Yahoo! 
Mail, is to attract lots of  users with a free service and convince some of  them to 
upgrade to a subscription-based ‘premium’ one that adds higher quality or better 
features. Because digital services are cheap to offer, the free customers cost the 
company so little that it can afford to convert only a tiny fraction of  them to paying 
customers.”186
In this context, courts and agencies may fail to understand the basic character-
istics of  certain technology-enabled markets, and mistakenly uphold allegations 
of  unlawful abuse. The recent Bottin Cartographes/Google France, Google Inc case 
provides a striking illustration of  this. The case concerned the Google Maps 
API,187 a bundle of  applications licensed for free to companies willing to embed 
Google maps on their websites. More precisely, companies that use the Google 
Maps API can offer a string of  services on their websites, such as the Geocoding 
web service (fi nding latitudes and longitudes on a Google map), the Directions 
web service (fi nding itineraries on a Google map), the Distance web service 
(estimating the length of  journeys with Google maps) and Street View images.
A French company which until then had sold competing online mapping 
services, Bottin Cartographes, brought proceedings against Google. The main 
allegation was that the zero pricing of  the Google Maps API was predatory 
and therefore in violation of  the French rules on abuse of  dominance. In a 
somewhat nonsensical judgment, the Court of  Commerce of  Paris upheld 
Bottin Cartographes’ claim.188 It held that the sale price of  the Google Maps 
API was “equal to 0” and could thus not allow Google to recoup any of  
the production costs inevitably incurred by Google for the provision of  such 
services. Moreover, those costs, which primarily consist of  those incurred for 
obtaining “the rights for the geographic data (or aerial views)”, were likely to be 
185 See H Varian, “Versioning Information Goods”, paper prepared for Digital Information and 
Intellectual Property, Harvard University, 23–25 January 1997, available at http://people.
ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/version.pdf.
186 See C Anderson, The Long Tail (Hyperion, 2006), 223.
187 Application Programming Interface. The case was not about the general Google Maps “portal” 
or the paid-for product “Google Maps API Premier”.
188 See Tribunal de commerce de Paris, 15ème chambre, Jugement du 31 janvier 2012, Bottin Car-
tographes Google France, Google Inc.
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high, given that “Google, due to its global coverage, must aggregate data from 
several dozen suppliers”.189 The Court further found that this had not only led 
to the elimination of  all competitors on the market (although the Court cites 
only one such competitor, Maporama, whilst Bottin remained present in the 
market), but “was evidently part of  a wider exclusionary strategy”. In language 
redolent of  conspiracy theories, the Court stated that, from the start, Google 
had sought to pursue the hidden goal of  displaying targeted advertising on 
maps placed on fi rms’ websites, with a view to basically milking advertisers.
There are good reasons to consider that the Court got it wrong in the light 
of  the specifi c business model at play in the relevant market.190 How, indeed, 
could the Court assert that Google would not recoup its costs with its free 
licensing policy while acknowledging that advertisers would bear the brunt of  
this policy through prices charged for targeted advertising? In saying this, the 
Court unwittingly highlighted the existence of  a classic two-sided effect—that 
the Google Maps API provided for free to companies was simply fi nanced by 
advertisers—yet entirely overlooked it.
The Court could have just paid a short visit to Google’s website to understand 
that the provision of  the Google Maps API for free is also a classic example 
of  versioning (see Fig 3). Google only gives away the basic version of  Google 
Maps API for free. Companies wishing to offer more functionality to visitors 
of  their website can purchase Google Maps API for business, which is licensed 
under specifi c fi nancial conditions. To a certain extent, the price charged for 
Google Maps API for business thus fi nances the “free” offering of  Google 
Maps API. 
The analysis above should sound a note of  caution for courts and agencies 
dealing with allegations of  predatory pricing on technology-enabled markets. 
First, low or zero prices should generally be deemed to benefi t consumers—
they are the essence of  a perfect competitive process.191 Secondly, any price–cost 
analysis of  predatory abuse allegations should be based on the price charged 
either to indirect users in the case of  multi-sided markets or on the price 
charged for other products in the case of  versioning.
189 Here, the Court’s analysis is again misguided. Those costs are fi xed costs that Google should 
normally not try to recoup in the short run, and which in turn have no bearing on prices. 
190 Somewhat more worryingly, the Court of  Commerce seemed to ignore the basic principles of  
the law on abuse. For instance, it observed that the objective of  eventually exploiting advertis-
ers was an “exclusionary strategy”, which it is not.
191 Moreover, if  products/services are given away for free, this means that fi nancial switching costs 
are likely to be extremely low, as consumers will make no sunk investment into a product or 
service.
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5. Price Discrimination
Price discrimination is a natural pricing strategy in technology-enabled 
markets.192 As noted by Chris Anderson, a rule of  good business in ICT markets 
is that one price does not fi t all.193 Three main reasons are often advanced to 
explain why price discrimination is a pervasive strategy in such markets. First, 
it is very common for technology-enabled markets to exhibit high (or constant) 
fi xed costs and low (or zero) marginal costs.194 Given that technology suppliers 
are not capacity constrained, they have incentives to price discriminate in order 
to sell as many units as possible because each unit sold above marginal cost 
contributes to the recovery of  fi xed cost.195 This logic works both for informa-
tion goods (eg media content) and physical goods (eg chipsets). 
Secondly, the very features of  ICTs make it exponentially easier for suppliers 
to charge customised prices for similar goods/services, based on customer 
behaviour, characteristics, location, etc. Information technologies such as click-
stream tracking,196 online registration, cookies and privacy settings197 enable 
“fi ne grained observation and analysis of  consumer behaviour”.198 Amazon, for 
instance, has been reported to offer CDs and books at different prices, based 
on the clickstream pattern of  visitors.199 Similarly, information technologies 
entitle the widespread and timely use of  individualised pricing techniques such 
as auctions and yield management.200 For instance, eBay combines both by 
offering similar products through auctions (at low prices, but with  uncertainty) 
192 See Anderson, supra n 186, 211.
193 Ibid.
194 See Varian et al, supra n 12.
195 The situation is different in non-technology markets, where there are capacity constraints. In 
those markets, fi xed cost recovery does not take the form of  output maximisation practices, 
but is achieved through value maximisation strategies on the range of  supplies that can be 
produced.
196 See Forbes, “I Got it Cheaper than You”, available at http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/1998/1102/6210082a_print.html:
“software that lets a Web-based merchant such as Amazon.com identify individual visitors 
to its Web site. Then the software studies a Web-surfer’s “clickstream”—the way that person 
navigates through the Web site. Based on that behaviour, the software can instantaneously 
target the shoppers for specifi c products and prices. If  that visitor behaves like a price-sen-
sitive shopper—perhaps by comparing many different products without buying—he may be 
offered a lower price”.
197 See Y Chen, “Oligopoly Price Discrimination by Purchase History” in Fredenberg and Strand, 
supra n 74 119.
198 See Varian et al, supra n 12, 12.
199 See J McGuigan, R Moyer and F Harris, Managerial Economics (South-Western College Publica-
tions, 1998).
200 Yield management may be described as a method for managing capacity profi tably in order 
to maximise yield or profi ts from a fi xed resource. For instance, regarding airline seats, yield 
management often involves overbooking. S Kimes, “A Strategic Approach to Yield Management” 
in A Ingold, U McMahon-Beattie and I Yeoman (eds), Yield Management. Strategies for the Service 
Industries (Thomson, 2nd edn, 2000), 2; S Kimes and R Chase, “The Strategic Levers of  Yield 
Management” (1998) 2 Journal of  Service Research 156.
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or under the “Buy It Now” system (higher prices).201 A somewhat less well 
known example is that of  Radiohead. In 2007, the rock band offered its latest 
LP, In Rainbows, online for whatever individual users wanted to pay.202 
Thirdly, many of  those markets are component markets, where users 
purchase combinations of  individual components rather than a pre-assembled, 
homogeneous end-product. Dell, who popularised the sale of  online-customised 
computers to customers, offers a topical example of  this in relation to physical 
goods.203 Similarly, consumers of  information goods often purchase micro-
chunks of  data.204 For instance, music users will typically not purchase a full 
LP but, rather, download a range of  titles from competing bands, across music 
styles. In the same vein, readers of  online newspapers almost never read a full 
journal issue but, rather, purchase a variety of  articles of  interest to them. As 
a result, most of  those customers end up with an individualised product, which 
can be subject to a specifi c price tag. Last but not least, suppliers of  informa-
tion goods enjoy a greater ability to offer similar products/services in different 
versions, packages and formats, and to charge distinct prices for them. For 
instance, Yahoo! has been reported to offer 20-minutes-delayed stock prices for 
free and real-time stock quotes for $9.95 per month. This form of  versioning, 
which is widespread in the software industry, is from an economic standpoint205 
akin to price discrimination.
It is obvious that the observed ubiquity of  price discrimination in technology-
enabled markets has the potential to bring it into confl ict with the Article 102(c) 
TFEU stipulation that it is abusive for a dominant fi rm to “appl[y] dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage”. Nevertheless, we believe that the enforce-
ment of  Article 102(c) TFEU in technology-enabled markets should remain at 
best limited. This viewpoint is anchored in the wording of  the Treaty itself. 
First, Article 102(c) TFEU requires that the differential pricing scheme leads to 
the application of  distinct prices to “equivalent transactions”. Although it casts 
little light on this concept, the ECJ’s case law suggests that two transactions are 
equivalent if  they cover goods or services which, from the customer’s perspec-
tive, constitute functional and geographic substitutes for each other. In other 
201 See Anderson, supra n 186, 221.
202 See the website http://www.mavaru.com/, which has fully endorsed the “pay for what it’s 
worth” business model for the distribution of  online music.
203 See Varian et al, supra n 12, 13, referring to this as “mass customization” or “personalization”. 
204 See Anderson, supra n 186, 220.
205 See Varian, supra n 185, 1:
“the point of  versioning is to get the consumers to sort themselves into different groups 
according to their willingness to pay. Consumers with high willingness to pay choose one 
version, while consumers with lower willingness to pay choose a different version. The 
producer chooses the versions so as to induce the consumers to “self-select” into appropri-
ate categories.”
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words, two (or more) transactions are equivalent if  they relate to two (or more) 
goods or services that belong to the same market. As such, the Article 102(c) 
TFEU prohibition should not apply to widespread practices, such as product 
customisation, versioning or yield management, whose very existence demon-
strates, in and of  itself, that they are not viewed as substitutes by customers.
Secondly, another reason that leads us to believe that the application of  
Article 102(c) TFEU should remain limited in technology-enabled markets is 
that this provision does not catch conduct targeted at end-users in retail market 
segments, where price discrimination appears to be the most pervasive in tech-
nology-enabled markets (at least if  we rely on the amount of  economic literature 
devoted to price discrimination on such segments as a proxy). The wording of  
Article 102(c) TFEU only prohibits practices that place “trading parties” at a 
“competitive disadvantage”. But, end-users are not trading parties who can 
entertain competitive relations amongst themselves. Hence, they cannot suffer 
from any competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis each other within the meaning of  
Article 102(c) TFEU. 
Likewise, discriminatory price cuts that harm the dominant fi rm’s direct 
competitors (primary-line injury price discrimination), rather than its trading 
parties (secondary-line injury price discrimination) should not be caught by the 
prohibition of  Article 102(c) TFEU. Of  course, the old case law of  the ECJ 
has occasionally disregarded the Treaty wording by fi nding unlawful primary-
line injury price discrimination (eg in Hoffmann-La Roche,206 Michelin I207 and Irish 
Sugar208),209 but this decisional stream has dried out in recent years.
In fact, the requirement that the pricing practice puts one (or more) firm(s) at 
a competitive disadvantage seems to restrict the scope of  application of  Article 
102(c) TFEU to markets where a vertically integrated fi rm has a subsidiary 
that it seeks to favour over downstream rivals.210 This fi nding has been cor-
roborated by scholars. Swanson and Baumol, for instance, consider that risks 
of  anticompetitive price discrimination are more plausible in market settings 
involving vertically integrated fi rms, and possibly IPR holders.211 In contrast, 
206 See Hoffmann-La Roche, supra n 45.
207 See Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin, supra n 105.
208 See Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar plc v Commission [1999] ECR II-2969.
209 On this strand of  case law see, eg D Geradin and N Petit, “Price Discrimination under EC 
Competition Law: Another Antitrust Doctrine in Search of  Limiting Principles?” (2006) 2 
Journal of  Competition Law and Economics 479; M Armstrong, “Price Discrimination”, MRPA 
paper (October 2006), available at http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14500/1/14500.pdf; R Inderst and 
T Valletti, “Price Discrimination in Input Markets” (2009) 1 The RAND Journal of  Economics 1.
210 It could also be argued that, similarly to excessive prices, a fi nding of  abuse under Art 102 
TFEU seems possible only if  the upstream fi rm holds an input that is “indispensable” within 
the meaning of  the case law. Otherwise, the dominant fi rm can lawfully refuse to supply. It 
would be nonsensical to condemn such a dominant fi rm for abusive discrimination against 
rivals, whilst deeming it free to harm those very same rivals by withholding supplies.
211 See D Swanson and W Baumol, “Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, 
Standards Selection, and Control of  Market Power” (2005) 1 Antitrust Law Journal 26.
April 2013 European Competition Journal 57
whilst theoretically possible from a legal standpoint, secondary-line injury price 
discrimination by a non-integrated dominant fi rm seems implausible from an 
economic standpoint (for instance, a pure IP licensor). No dominant seller ever 
has any incentives to distort downstream competition on pain of  undermining: 
(i) competition for the distribution of  its products/services; and/or (ii) its own 
market power. 
Interestingly, despite a paucity of  precedents, the Commission’s biggest 
pending case in a technology-enabled market revolves around issues of  abusive 
secondary-line injury discrimination.212 In the ongoing investigation against 
Google, the main theory of  harm under consideration appears to be that 
Google manipulates the natural results returned by its general search engine to 
grant preferential placement to links pointing to its own related vertical search 
services at the expense of  rivals.213 Vertical search engines are search engines 
that focus on a specifi c segment of  online content, eg comparison-shopping 
websites (also called shopbots), travel search engines214 and restaurant search 
engines.215 Google controls several such engines—eg Google Flight Search, 
Google News, Google Product Search, Google Scholar—from which it derives 
signifi cant advertisement revenues. 
Google’s alleged placing of  its own vertical search sites on top of  ranking 
results would create a competitive disadvantage for its rivals because users would 
be driven towards Google’s vertical search engines rather than towards as-effi -
cient rival ones.216 A fi gure commonly cited is that the fi rst three links displayed 
212 Google was also condemned (upon interim relief) in France for abusive discrimination. See 
Autorité de la concurrence’s Press Release, “Following the Interim Measures Issued by the 
Autorité de la concurrence last June, Google Commits to Modify in a More Transparent and 
Predictable Way for Advertisers the Rules Governing its Online Advertising Service, AdWords”, 
28 October 2010, available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_
rub=368&id_article=1488.
213 As explained by Commissioner Almunia:
“First, in its general search results on the web, Google displays links to its own vertical 
search services. Vertical search services are specialised search engines which focus on specifi c 
topics, such as for example restaurants, news or products. Alongside its general search service, 
Google also operates several vertical search services of  this kind in competition with other 
players. In its general search results, Google displays links to its own vertical search services 
differently than it does for links to competitors. We are concerned that this may result in 
preferential treatment compared to those of  competing services, which may be hurt as a consequence” 
(emphasis added).
See “Statement of  Vice-President Almunia on the Google Antitrust Investigation”, supra n 25. The 
allegation in the EU seems to focus on natural search results, and abusive manipulation of  the 
algorithm, while in the US, the investigation seems also concerned with increases in the prices of  
ad rates for competitors.
214 Expedia and TripAdvisor are parties to the proceedings.
215 These vertical search engines are the ones that generate the highest revenues. 
216 Whilst empirical studies abound on the correlation between search results and clicking rates, 
and reach distinct results, most stress the common feature that the top three search results 
garner a large majority of  clicks. Results displayed on the second page attract a comparatively 
marginal number of  clicks.
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on a search engine get approximately 80% of  the traffi c. This practice would 
allow Google to demote rival vertical search engines in its search ranking. 
Without user clicks, those rival search engines would lose search accuracy, and 
would eventually be forced off  the market because of  their inability to generate 
good search results.217 Of  course, users remain at any rate free to directly visit 
a vertical search portal. As is often argued by Google, competition is just “one 
click away”.218 Yet it seems that 90% of  users do not directly use vertical search 
engines.219 They appear to begin by conducting so-called “meta searches” in 
general search engines (for instance, a trip from Brussels to Papeete), and only 
subsequently click on links towards vertical search engines (that would lead 
them, for instance, to a specialised travel search engine).
At this stage, the outcome of  the Google investigation remains unclear. 
6. Abusive Litigation
Theories of  harm based on abusive litigation have not, to the best of  our 
knowledge, featured prominently in cases brought by the Commission over the 
last several decades. This has changed in recent months, as the Commission 
has launched, in quick succession, formal investigations into Samsung’s220 and 
Motorola’s221 enforcement of  their respective SEPs. Judging from the content 
of  the Commission’s press releases, it seems that the Commission is considering 
whether the mere act, by a holder of  SEPs (who has committed to license them 
on FRAND terms), of  seeking injunctive relief  against an unlicensed imple-
menter of  that standard constitutes an abuse of  a dominant position:
“Following complaints by Apple and Microsoft, the Commission will investigate, in 
particular, whether by seeking and enforcing injunctions against Apple’s and Micro-
soft’s fl agship products such as iPhone, iPad, Windows and Xbox on the basis of  
patents it had declared essential to produce standard-compliant products, Motorola 
has failed to honour its irrevocable commitments made to standard-setting organi-
sations. In these commitments, Motorola engaged to license those standard-essential 
patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The Commission 
will examine whether Motorola’s behaviour amounts to an abuse of  a dominant 
market position prohibited by Article 102 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the 
EU (TFEU).”
217 A search engine—in this context, a vertical search engine—needs to run a minimum scale 
of  searches on a daily basis to be effi cient. It needs in particular to investigate the searching 
pattern of  users on their search engine (where they go, how they click, etc). To achieve sta-
tistically signifi cant results, this investigation must be implemented using a suffi ciently sizeable 
cohort of  users. Here again, therefore, size matters for search engines’ accuracy.
218 For a critical appraisal of  this assertion see C Argenton and J Prüfer, “Search Engine Compe-
tition with Network Externalities” (2012) 1 Journal of  Competition Law & Economics 73.
219 Only a very narrow category of  internet users have preferred sites to which they go directly. 
220 See Commission Press Release, “Commission Opens Proceedings against Samsung”, supra n 82.
221 See Commission Press Release, “Commission Opens Proceedings against Motorola”, supra n 83.
April 2013 European Competition Journal 59
While the press releases announcing these investigations do not explain the 
Commission’s approach in any detail, some insight into its current thinking 
can be gained from its Decision of  13 February 2012 approving Google Inc’s 
acquisition of  Motorola Mobility. In considering whether Google would have 
an incentive, following the proposed acquisition, to prevent third parties from 
gaining access to its SEPs in an anticompetitive manner, the Commission 
stated:222
“106. [A]ny company manufacturing products incorporating a certain standard 
must either obtain the appropriate licences covering the technology included in 
that standard or risk infringing the IP rights of  the patent holders’ reading on the 
standardised technology. In the event licensing discussions fail, the SEP holder may 
ultimately take its counterparty to court and seek an injunction . . .;
107. Depending on the circumstances, it may be that the threat of  an injunction, the 
seeking of  an injunction or indeed the actual enforcement of  an injunction granted 
against a good faith licensee, may signifi cantly impede effective competition by, for 
example, forcing the potential licensee into agreeing to potentially onerous licensing 
terms which it would otherwise not have agreed to . . . To the extent that injunc-
tions are actually enforced, this furthermore may have a direct negative effect on 
consumers if  products are excluded from the market. Even if  exclusion of  competing 
products from the market through injunctions were to be temporary (ie. there would 
be a delay only in access to the relevant products until the counter-party of  the SEP 
holder agreed to the commercial terms demanded), in a fast-moving market such as 
the smart mobile device market, serious harm could potentially be caused by it.”223
This Decision therefore appears to suggest that an SEP holder who has given 
a FRAND commitment and then threatens to seek, seeks or enforces an 
injunction on the basis of  its SEPs could, in some circumstances, be regarded 
as abusing a dominant position in a relevant market.
This reading appears to have been confi rmed by the Commission’s press 
release announcing the adoption of  a Statement of  Objections against Samsung:
“The European Commission has informed Samsung of  its preliminary view that 
Samsung’s seeking of  injunctions against Apple in various Member States on the 
basis of  its mobile phone standard-essential patents (‘SEPs’) amounts to an abuse of  
a dominant position prohibited by EU antitrust rules. While recourse to injunctions 
is a possible remedy for patent infringements, such conduct may be abusive where 
SEPs are concerned and the potential licensee is willing to negotiate a licence on 
Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (so-called “FRAND”) terms.”224
222 See Google/Motorola Mobility, supra n 50.
223 Ibid, para 107.
224 See Commission Press Release, “Commission Sends Statement of  Objections to Samsung on 
Potential Misuse of  Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents,” IP/12/1448, 21 December 
2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm.
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To date, the ECJ has ruled only twice in cases of  alleged abusive litigation. 
The fi rst such case was ITT Promedia,225 a ruling in which the General Court 
(then the Court of  First Instance) appeared to have de facto endorsed the legal 
standard, proposed by the Commission, that must be applied before a fi nding 
can be reached that judicial proceedings brought by a dominant fi rm constitute 
an abuse of  that dominant position.226 That legal standard requires that two 
cumulative criteria be met:
“the action (i) cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish the rights 
of  the undertaking concerned and can therefore only serve to harass the opposite 
party; and
(ii) it is conceived in the framework of  a plan whose goal is to eliminate competition.”227
The Court went on to identify two key principles which must guide the 
Commission’s assessment of  any claim of  abusive litigation. The fi rst of  those 
principles is that access to the Court, ie. the ability to ask a judge to protect 
one’s rights, is itself  a fundamental right, protected by quasi-constitutional 
rules, and therefore that the institution of  legal proceedings will constitute an 
abuse “only in wholly exceptional circumstances”: 
“[T]he ability to assert one’s rights through the courts and the judicial control which 
that entails constitute the expression of  a general principle of  law which underlies 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and which is also laid 
down in Articles 6 and 13 of  the European Convention for the Protection of  Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of  4 November 1950 . . . As access to the Court 
is a fundamental right and a general principle ensuring the rule of  law, it is only 
in wholly exceptional circumstances that the fact that legal proceedings are brought 
is capable of  constituting an abuse of  a dominant position within the meaning of  
Article [102] of  the Treaty.”228 
The second principle is that any exception to the right of  access to the courts 
must be construed narrowly:
“[S]ince the two cumulative criteria constitute an exception to the general principle 
of  access to the courts, which ensures the rule of  law, they must be construed and 
applied strictly, in a manner which does not defeat the application of  the general 
rule . . .”229
225 See Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v Commission [1998] ECR II-2937.
226 Ibid, paras 57–58. Despite statements to the contrary, in two previous paragraphs of  its ruling, 
the Court had stated that there was “no need for it to rule on the correctness of  the criteria 
chosen by the Commission in the contested decision” on the grounds that the applicant had 
“not challenge[d] the compatibility of  those criteria as such with Article 86 of  the Treaty”. 
However, the Court then went on to examine whether the Commission’s proposed criteria were 
satisfi ed. 
227 Ibid, para 55.
228 Ibid, para 60.
229 Ibid, para 61.
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Almost 15 years elapsed before the Court was again asked to consider a claim 
of  abusive litigation. In Protégé,230 the General Court unambiguously cast aside 
any doubts regarding the applicable legal standard by explicitly affi rming the 
substance of  the test proposed by the Commission in ITT Promedia. The facts 
in Protégé are as follows. The complainant alleged that Pernod Ricard SA had 
abused a dominant position in the market for Irish whiskey, in particular by 
bringing trademark opposition proceedings before the trademark offi ces of  
several European jurisdictions and the European trademark agency (OHIM) 
against the complainant’s attempt to register several whiskey brands in order 
to delay its entry into the market. The Commission rejected the complaint on 
the grounds that it lacked suffi cient Community interest to warrant further 
investigation. On appeal to the General Court, the Commission’s decision was 
upheld. The Court reiterated that the Commission had a wide discretion as to 
whether or not to investigate complaints.231
Of  signifi cance for present purposes, in Protégé the General Court clarifi ed 
the two cumulative criteria set out by the Commission in ITT Promedia, in 
particular by confi rming that the fi rst criterion contains, in reality, two limbs. 
The fi rst limb requires proof  that the action “cannot reasonably be considered 
as an attempt to establish the rights of  the undertaking concerned” because 
it is manifestly objectively unreasonable or manifestly unfounded. The second 
limb appears to require separate proof  that the action has no goal other than 
to harass the opposite party.232 In addition, the General Court reiterated that 
the two cumulative criteria must be applied restrictively, lest they undermine 
the general principle of  access to the courts.233
Let us consider the Commission’s recent investigations of  Samsung and 
Motorola in the light of  the legal principles set out in ITT Promedia234 as sub-
sequently reaffi rmed in Protégé (hereinafter the ITT Promedia test). The fi rst 
hurdle the Commission will have to face will consist in showing that Samsung 
and Motorola occupy dominant positions. Contrary to the position adopted by 
some commentators, ownership of  one SEP or a portfolio of  SEPs does not 
necessarily confer dominance.
The fundamental elements of  a claim for patent infringement are that: 
(i) the claimant owns the relevant patent(s) and they are valid; and (ii) the 
defendant has infringed or is likely to infringe the patent(s). However, in a 
230 See Case T-119/09 Protégé International Ltd v European Commission, Judgment of  the General Court 
of  13 September 2012 (not yet reported).
231 Ibid, paras 32–42.
232 Ibid, para 57: “The Commission rightfully considered that the objectively unreasonable character 
of  the claim or the absence of  legal ground that the claim must exhibit to be abusive was not 
manifest in casu” (our translation—no offi cial English version available yet).
233 Ibid, para 49.
234 On this case, see also S Preece, “ITT Promedia v EC Commission: Establishing an Abuse of  
Predatory Litigation?” (1999) 2 European Competition Law Review 118.
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patent infringement action brought by an owner of  SEPs, the existence of  
these elements appears to be the very essence of  a fi nding of  dominance. 
In other words, unless the patents are owned by the patentee, are valid and 
are infringed (because they are indeed essential to mandatory portions of  the 
standard), then their ownership will not have conferred a dominant position 
on the patent holder and there can therefore be no claim that their exercise 
is abusive.
Assuming that the SEP holder is dominant, if  the Commission were to 
proceed to the next step and apply the ITT Promedia legal standard, it would 
have to begin by asking whether a request for an injunction by an SEP holder 
who has given a FRAND commitment can reasonably be considered as an 
attempt to establish the patent owner’s rights—or, conversely, whether it is 
manifest that such a request for an injunction is objectively unfounded and 
has no other goal than to harass the opposite party.
Given that the Commission’s concerns relate to the role of  the FRAND 
commitment made by the patent holder, the question then becomes: in which 
circumstances would the fact that a FRAND commitment was given by the 
SEP holder result in the request for an injunction being considered manifestly 
unfounded? In our view, a request for an injunction by an SEP holder who 
has given a FRAND commitment could only be deemed manifestly unfounded 
by reason of  a failure to comply with such a FRAND commitment in the 
most exceptional of  circumstances where the SEP holder could not have been 
unaware that the request for an injunction was baseless and would be rejected 
by the Court. This could conceivably be the case only where at least two 
cumulative conditions are met: (i) the SEP owner’s failure to discharge its duties 
to negotiate in good faith in accordance with the FRAND commitment is 
manifest; and (ii) the implementer acted in a manner consistent with its duty to 
act in good faith and satisfi ed any other requirements provided under Member 
State law that must be met in order for an application for an injunction to be 
denied.
In our view, the fi rst condition identifi ed above (ie a manifest failure by the 
SEP owner to discharge its duties under the FRAND commitment) will be 
satisfi ed only in the limited circumstances where: (i) the patent holder refused 
to make any licensing offer or negotiate following an approach by an imple-
menter; and (ii) the patent holder made an offer containing licensing terms 
so egregiously unreasonable that even on the most cursory of  examinations a 
court could not fail to conclude that the patent owner was acting in manifest 
bad faith. A fi nding that the SEP owner’s licensing proposal was merely 
unreasonable—or even highly unreasonable—or any court ruling denying the 
requested remedy, would not in itself  be suffi cient to satisfy the fi rst limb of  
the ITT Promedia test. This is clear from, in particular, paragraph 57 of  the 
Protégé judgment, which emphasised the requirement that the proceedings serve 
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no purpose other than to harass the opposing party. By contrast, a fi nding by 
a court (including a preliminary fi nding) that the licensing terms offered by the 
SEP owner were not unreasonable, or a court decision granting the injunction 
applied for, should be considered conclusive evidence that the action was not 
manifestly unfounded.
Similarly, the second condition of  the ITT Promedia test, ie that the pro-
ceedings form part of  a plan to eliminate competition, is also likely to be 
particularly diffi cult for the Commission to demonstrate. It is clear, for example, 
that conduct by an SEP owner aimed merely at “forcing the potential licensee 
into agreeing to potentially onerous licensing terms which it would otherwise 
not have agreed to” or forcing “a holder of  non-SEPs to cross-license those 
non-SEPs to it in return for a licence of  the SEPs”—the two possibilities raised 
as the main competitive concerns regarding SEPs in the Commission’s Google/
Motorola Decision235—is not suffi cient alone to satisfy the ITT Promedia standard. 
In other words, conduct designed merely to exploit a standards implementer, as 
opposed to excluding such an implementer from the market, cannot constitute 
abusive litigation. Moreover, the second condition of  the ITT Promedia test 
makes clear that non-practising entities (pure licensors) that seek merely to 
license, and not implement, SEPs cannot be held guilty of  abuse when they 
seek injunctions against SEP implementers as they are not in a competitive 
relationship with the latter. More importantly, perhaps, it would be irrational 
for an SEP holder to seek an injunction as part of  a plan to eliminate com-
petition. This is because a standards implementer can always expect to avoid 
an injunction by agreeing, or showing itself  to be willing, to take a licence on 
FRAND terms, and no court in Europe will grant such an injunction without 
fi rst being satisfi ed that the licensor has complied with its duty to offer a licence 
on FRAND terms.
These are high hurdles to overcome, and for good reason. The judicial choice 
of  such a demanding legal standard for this type of  abuse is predicated on the 
recognition that access to justice is a fundamental right, and as such can only 
be encroached upon in the most exceptional of  circumstances. Moreover, from 
a public policy standpoint, a less stringent standard would have the potential 
to weaken the patent enforcement system which underpins the promotion of  
innovation. It should be noted that the analysis above applies strictly to the 
“abuse of  litigation” claim, not to whether the patent owner should or should 
not obtain an injunction in the patent infringement proceedings it brought. 
These are mostly separate questions and should not be confl ated. Courts are 
well equipped to deal with, and routinely grant or deny, requests for injunctions 
lodged by owners of  essential as well as non-essential patents.
235 See Google/Motorola Mobility, supra n 50, para 107.
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Against this background, it is very worrying that, in its assessment of  the 
Google/Motorola merger, the Commission appears to have reached the view that 
the possibility that an SEP owner will seek or secure an injunction could be 
anticompetitive without so much as a cursory examination of  the cumulative 
conditions of  the ITT Promedia test.236 In our view, any suggestion that such 
conduct by an SEP owner (regardless of  whether he has given a FRAND 
commitment) can attract antitrust liability outside the very narrow circum-
stances set out in ITT Promedia or under a different legal standard would be 
ludicrous.
G. CONCLUSION
We conclude with two observations, one on substance and the other on process.
First, whilst recent ECJ rulings show the Court’s (and the Commission Legal 
Service’s) almost complete unwillingness to abandon the obsolete form-based 
approach in the enforcement of  Article 102 TFEU, the ever-increasing 
importance of  markets belonging to the new economy makes the transition 
towards an effects-based approach more necessary than ever. An underestimated, 
and seldom mentioned, advantage of  a clear endorsement of  effects-based legal 
standards is that they would increase legal certainty and administrative effi cien-
cy.237 This is because the legal standards currently applied under Article 102 
are too loose, often inconsistent and frequently arbitrary, while legal standards 
based on the effects of  a course of  conduct offer a coherent methodology, a 
set of  well-defi ned and well-understood theories of  anticompetitive harm, and 
a toolbox of  specifi c evidentiary instruments.
Secondly, due to their dynamic nature, technology-enabled markets are 
often viewed as optimal candidates for quick-fi x, rapid remedial intervention 
236 Ibid, para 116:
“In conclusion, the Commission considers that Google is likely to have some ability post-
transaction, in particular through seeking and enforcing injunctions, to signifi cantly impede 
effective competition, including by potentially extracting onerous licensing terms from good 
faith potential licensees to which they would otherwise not have agreed, be it in respect of  
royalty levels or other licence terms (for example, the scope of  the end products to which the 
licence must apply) or cross-licence.”
See also paras 113, 115, 126–28.
237 See P Marsden, “Checks and Balances: European Competition Law and the Rule of  Law” 
(2009) 22(1), Loyola Consumer Law Review 51, observing at 61 that:
“the reliance on more economics and balancing tests, like the rule of  reason, may be what 
allows EU competition law to better accord with the rule of  law. This can only happen, 
however, if  judges are themselves able and willing to undertake more rigorous evaluation 
rather than rely on precedents that were never informed by economic analysis.”
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by agencies and courts.238 This should be avoided, as the risk and cost of  type I 
errors (false conviction) is signifi cantly greater in those markets. Antitrust inter-
vention in fast-moving sectors should not occur at an early stage of  market 
development—ex post enforcement should remain the rule. By contrast, mature, 
slow-moving markets can be subject to a more ex ante approach, given that 
agencies are better able to predict their evolution and avoid regulatory mistakes. 
Even in sector-specifi c regulation, where ex ante intervention is the paradigm, 
the Commission recognises the perils of  premature regulatory intervention:
“Newly emerging markets should not be subject to inappropriate obligations, even 
if  there is a fi rst mover advantage . . . Newly emerging markets are considered to 
comprise products or services, where, due to their novelty, it is very diffi cult to predict 
demand conditions or market entry and supply conditions, and consequently diffi cult 
to apply the three criteria. The purpose of  not subjecting newly emerging markets 
to inappropriate obligations is to promote innovation . . .”239
Prudence, as opposed to precaution, should prevail.
238 See “Statement of  Vice-President Almunia on the Google antitrust investigation”, supra n 25:
“I believe that these fast-moving markets would particularly benefi t from a quick resolution 
of  the competition issues identifi ed. Restoring competition swiftly to the benefi t of  users at 
an early stage is always preferable to lengthy proceedings, although these sometimes become 
indispensable to competition enforcement.”
239 See Commission Recommendation of  17 December 2007, supra n 35, para 7.
